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Stone: Least Restrictive Environment

THE LEAST RESTRICTIVE ENVIRONMENT FOR
PROVIDING EDUCATION, TREATMENT, AND
COMMUNITY SERVICES FOR PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES:
RETHINKING THE CONCEPT
Donald H. Stone*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Persons with disabilities seek acceptance and connection in
society.
From individuals with mental illness, children with
intellectual disabilities, and wheelchair users, all desire integration
rather than isolation, mainstreaming rather than segregation. In fact,
the American with Disabilities Act of 1990 (hereinafter “ADA”),1 the
landmark civil rights act protecting persons with a physical or mental
impairment, has a stated purpose that recognizes the right to fully
participate in all aspects of society.2
Discrimination against
individuals with disabilities is all too frequently found in housing,
education, institutionalization and access to public services.3 At the
cornerstone of disability protection is the concept of providing services
in the least restrictive environment (hereinafter “LRE”), or the most
integrated setting appropriate, known as the mainstreaming concept.4
In the involuntary confinement of the allegedly dangerously
mentally ill, the education of the child with disabilities, and the
location of community group homes for the intellectually disabled,
* Donald H. Stone, Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law, B.A. Rutgers
University; J.D. Temple University School of Law. I dedicate this Article to my late father,
Gerald Paul Stone, a person who battled mental illness his whole life with determination and
courage. I gratefully acknowledge my research assistant, Sarah Simmons, a 2019 graduate of
the University of Baltimore School of Law, for her exceptional legal research in the
preparation of this article.
1 Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1210112213).
2 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1) (2018).
3 Id. § 12101(a)(3).
4 See infra notes 47-63 and accompanying text.
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disability advocates have sought integration and mainstreaming as a
common theme. Why is the mainstreaming approach to persons with
disabilities such a prevalent concept? Are persons with disabilities
always appropriately served utilizing a strict mainstream approach?
Are educational institutions using the least restrictive environment to
underfund educational programs? Are psychiatric hospitals abiding by
the requirement that in-patient hospitalization be provided only if a less
restrictive alternative is not appropriate?
This Article will discuss and analyze the LRE concept
prevalent in the ADA and the Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act (hereinafter “IDEA”),5 as well as state laws as they relate to the
involuntary civil commitment of the mentally ill and community based
treatment for persons with disabilities. A historical perspective of the
least restrictive environment will be examined. An exploration of the
various uses of the least restrictive environment in civil commitment
laws, special education, group homes and community based treatment,
guardianships, and architectural accessibility will occur. A new
approach to the least restrictive environment will be offered with
recommendations for service providers, educational institutions, and
government entities.
II.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES OF THE LEAST RESTRICTIVE
ENVIRONMENT

The bedrock principle of disability law, the least restrictive
environment, has appeared in court decisions and legislation for more
than fifty years.6 The concept finds its roots in the civil rights
movement and court decisions of the 1950s and 60s, which set the
stage for the desire for equality for all persons regardless of race,
gender, or disability.7 The LRE has been expressed in a variety of
ways, however its origins can ultimately be traced back to due process

5 Pub. L. No. 101-476, 104 Stat. 1103 (2004) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 14001487).
6 See infra notes 7-27 and accompanying text.
7 See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Ed. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Although dealing with
racial equality, Brown influenced disability rights as well as “led the way to a growing
understanding that all people, regardless of race, gender or disability, have a right to a public
education.” Kelli J. Esteves & Shaila Rao, The Evolution of Special Education, PRINCIPAL
(Nov./Dec. 2008), https://www.naesp.org/sites/default/files/resources/1/Principal/2008/N-O
web2.pdf.
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concerns addressed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Shelton v. Tucker in
1960.8 The Shelton Court explained,
[E]ven though the governmental purpose be legitimate
and substantial, the purpose cannot be pursued by
means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties
when the end can be more narrowly achieved. The
breadth of legislative abridgement must be viewed in
the light of the less drastic means for achieving the
same basic purpose.9
The foundation of the LRE doctrine (noted by the Court as the
“less drastic means”) was illustrated in this case involving an Arkansas
statute which compelled school teachers, as a condition of employment
in a state-supported school or college, to file an affidavit listing every
organization they belonged or contributed to in the past five years.10
The Shelton Court declared this statute invalid as a violation of the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.11 While not directly
relating to disability law, this language laid the foundation for the LRE
principle.
The LRE concept in the education arena can be traced back to
the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975,12 renamed
the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”) in 2004.13 In
the IDEA, the least restrictive environment is a guiding principle and
is described as,
[T]o the maximum extent appropriate, children with
disabilities . . . are educated with children who are not
disabled, and special classes, separate schooling, or
other removal of children with disabilities from the
regular educational environment occurs only when the
nature or severity of the disability of a child is such that
8 364 U.S. 479 (1960). Eric D. Paulsrud, The Least Restrictive Alternative: A Theory of
Justice for the Mentally Retarded, 10 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 465, 488 (1987).
9 Id. at 488 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
10 Id. at 480.
11 Id. at 490.
12 Pub. L. No. 94-142, 29 Stat. 773 (1975) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 14001411).
13 Pub. L. No. 101-476, 104 Stat. 1103 (2004) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 14001487); Brian L. Porto, Application of 20 U.S.C.A. § 1412(a)(5), Least Restrictive Environment
Provision of Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1400 et seq.,
189 A.L.R. Fed. 297 (2003).
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education in regular classroom with the use of
supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved
satisfactorily.14
The IDEA findings assert that education of children with
disabilities can be made more effective by ensuring access to the
general educational curriculum in the regular classroom to the
maximum extent possible.15 Such a strong edict to focus the dialogue
on educational placement in the regular classroom will be challenged
in this Article, exploring a new alternative to the discussion between
school officials and the parents of disabled children.
The ADA also speaks volumes on the right to fully participate
in all aspects of society,16 with the goal of equality of opportunity,17
full participation,18 and the mandate that a public accommodation
“shall afford goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and
accommodations to an individual with a disability in the most
integrated setting appropriate to the needs of the individual.”19 In
addition, the ADA prevents a qualified individual with a disability
from being excluded from participating in services, programs, or
activities of a public entity.20 Furthermore, different or separate
services may not be provided “unless such action is necessary to
provide qualified individuals with disabilities with aids, benefits, or
services that are as effective as those provided to others.”21 This notion
of an integrated setting forms the basis of the LRE, the domain of first
choice.
In the context of the involuntary civil commitment of a person
with a mental illness who is allegedly dangerous to himself or others,
state statutes have also utilized the LRE criteria as one of the necessary
elements to secure in-patient psychiatric hospitalization.22
In
Maryland, for example, a key element for involuntary admission is that
there is “no available less restrictive form of intervention that is

14

20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A) (2018).
Id. § 1400(c)(5)(A).
16 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1) (2018).
17 Id. § 12101(a)(7).
18
Id.
19 28 C.F.R. § 36.203(a) (2018); id. § 36.104 (defining a public accommodation as a
“facility operated by a private entity whose operations affect commerce”).
20 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (defining public entity as a state or local government).
21 Id. § 35.130(b)(1)(iv).
22 See infra Appendix A.
15
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consistent with the welfare and safety of the individual.”23 This Article
will examine this concept and make recommendations that mandate
greater responsibility directed to state mental health officials.
In the context of community based treatment preference, rather
than institutionalization, the U.S. Supreme Court, in its landmark case
of Olmstead v. L.C., prohibited unjustified segregation of persons with
disabilities, describing it as a “form of discrimination.”24 The Court
noted that the ADA requires public entities to avoid institutional
settings and “to secure opportunities for people with developmental
disabilities to enjoy the benefits of community living,”25 as
institutional confinement “severely diminishes the everyday life
activities of individuals.”26 The affirmation for placing individuals
with mental disabilities in less restrictive settings affirms the ADA
mandate of full participation in all aspects of society.27 This has led to
significantly more community based mental health services and
housing opportunities.
In the context of guardianship law, a legal guardian owes a duty
to make every reasonable effort to ensure that the placement of his or
her ward is the least restrictive alternative.28 The varied ways in which
the least restrictive setting is included in disability law, from access to
services, education, community based treatment, and guardianship
duties, demonstrates the powerful doctrine so prevalent in society
today. Whether the term is “least restrictive environment,” “least
restrictive alternative,” or “least restrictive setting,” one thing is clear;
the mandate of inclusion of the disabled into all aspects of society is a
fundamental guiding principle of disability law.

23

MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 10-632(e)(2)(v) (West 2018).
527 U.S. 581, 599-600 (1999).
25 Id. at 599.
26 Id. at 601.
27 Id. at 587.
28 See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30-2628(a)(1) (2018) (“When establishing the ward’s
place of abode, a guardian shall make every reasonable effort to ensure that the placement is
the least restrictive alternative.”); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 3-1-206(a)(i)-(ii) (2018) (ensuring that
the ward under guardianship “shall have the right to: (i) The least restrictive and most
appropriate guardianship or conservatorship suitable to the ward’s circumstances” applying to
“residential, educational and employment environments”); ALASKA STAT. § 13.26.316 (2018)
(“[T]he guardian . . . shall assure that the ward has a place of abode in the least restrictive
setting consistent with the essential requirements for the ward’s physical health and safety.”).
24
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THE DEFINITION OF THE LEAST RESTRICTIVE
ALTERNATIVE CONCEPT

When Congress announced its motivation for enacting the
ADA, it recognized that physical and mental disabilities in no way
diminish a person’s right to fully participate in all aspects of society.29
In the ADA regulations addressing public entities, state or local
governments must not provide different or separate services to
individuals with disabilities “unless such action is necessary.”30
Similarly, in the ADA regulations addressing public accommodations,
an individual with a disability cannot be provided with services that
are different or separate unless such action is necessary.31 In addition,
such services shall be afforded “in the most integrated setting
appropriate to the needs of the individual.”32
In the context of special education services for children with a
disability, Congress seeks full participation33 and maintains that
education can be made more effective by “ensuring their access to the
general education curriculum in the regular classroom[] to the
maximum extent possible.”34
Furthermore, the regulations
acknowledge that education can be made more effective by “providing
appropriate special education and related services, and aids and
supports in the regular classroom, to such children, whenever
appropriate.”35 This mainstream focus, i.e., educating children with a
disability in the regular classroom, is the centerpiece of the IDEA.36
This focus will be challenged as part of this Article.
For the involuntary civil commitment of persons with mental
illness, almost all relevant state statutes contain a consideration of the
LRE principle in one form or another.37 For instance, the New Jersey
statute delineates a requirement that “[i]n determining the commitment
placement, the court shall consider the least restrictive environment for
the patient to receive . . . treatment that would ameliorate the danger
29

42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2) (2018).
28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(1)(iv) (2018).
31 Id. § 36.104 (public accommodations include a “facility operated by a private entity
whose operations affect commerce” and fall within twelve distinct categories); id. § 36.202.
32
Id. § 36.203(a).
33 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(1) (2018).
34 Id. § 1400(c)(5)(A).
35 Id. § 1400(c)(5)(D).
36 See id. § 1400.
37 See infra Appendix A.
30
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posed by the patient and provide the patient with appropriate
treatment.”38 The New Jersey civil commitment statute further defines
the term “least restrictive environment” as, “the available setting and
form of treatment that appropriately addresses a person’s need for care
and the need to respond to dangers to the person, others or property
and respects, to the greatest extent practicable, the person’s interests in
freedom of movement and self-direction.”39
The Pennsylvania Administrative Code provides a similarly
comprehensive description of the least restrictive alternative, focusing
on the placement or status being “available and appropriate.”40 These
limiting concepts whereby the least restrictive alternative must be
available will be another key focus of this Article, and requiring the
creation of less restrictive settings as a mandate will be explored.
The LRE concept is also articulated in state guardianship laws.
In Maryland, for instance, a guardian of a person is appointed by the
court for a disabled person for decisions involving “health care, food,
clothing, or shelter” when “no less restrictive form of intervention is
available which is consistent with the person’s welfare and safety.”41
IV.

COURT APPLICATION AND INTERPRETATION OF THE LRE

In Olmstead v. L.C., the U.S. Supreme Court announced, in no
uncertain terms, the preference for the less restrictive setting, and
highlighted the benefits of community living over institutions for
persons with mental disabilities.42 The ADA, according to the Court,
identifies “unjustified ‘segregation’ of persons with disabilities as a
‘for[m] of discrimination,’” criticizing unjustified segregation as
perpetuating unwarranted assumptions that persons so isolated are
incapable or unworthy of participating in community life.43
Furthermore, the Court recognized that institutional confinement

38

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-27.15a(a) (West 2018).
Id. § 30:4-27.2(gg).
40
55 PA. CODE § 5100.2 (2018) (“The least restrictive placement or status available and
appropriate to meet the needs of the patient and includes both restrictions on personal liberty
and the proximity of the treatment facility to the person’s natural environment.”).
41 MD. CODE. ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 13-705(b) (West 2018).
42 527 U.S. 581, 582 (1999).
43 Id. at 600 (alteration in original) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2)).
39
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“severely diminishes everyday life activities of individuals.”44 The
Olmstead decision is foundational in various areas of disability law.
A.

Special Education

The courts have on several occasions highlighted the least
restrictive setting in the special education arena. In the leading case of
Sacramento City Unified School District, Bd. of Educ. v. Rachel H.,
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit heard the demands for
placement in the regular classroom by parents of a child with
intellectual disabilities.45 The Court recognized the IDEA’s preference
for educating children with disabilities in regular classrooms with their
peers.46 The Court held the appropriate test in determining compliance
with the IDEA’s mainstream requirement was a four factor balancing
test, “(1) the educational benefits of placement full-time in a regular
class; (2) the non-academic benefits of such placement; (3) the effect
[the child with the disability] had on the teacher and children in the
regular class; and (4) the cost of mainstreaming [the child].”47 These
four factors were identified as considerations the school division must
take into account when determining if the disabled child’s least
restrictive environment is appropriate.48
The debate between educational placement in the regular or
special education setting was also confronted previously in 1989 by
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Daniel R.R. v. State
Board of Education, whereby the court recognized that the
conversation must shift to requiring schools to offer a “continuum of
alternative placements.”49 In determining compliance with the
mainstreaming requirement, the Daniel R.R. court held that the
Education of the Handicapped Act (hereinafter “EHA”), the precursor
to the IDEA, did not contemplate an all-or-nothing educational setting

44 Id. at 601. “[E]veryday life activities” include “family relations, social contacts, work
options, economic independence, educational advancement, and cultural enrichment.” Id.
45 14 F.3d 1398 (9th Cir. 1994) (discussing how the child’s proposed placement, as affected
by the school division, wrongly necessitated the child to move between the regular classroom
and the special education section six times each day).
46
Id. at 1403.
47 Id. at 1404. See Murray v. Montrose Cty. Sch. Dist., 51 F.3d 921, 929 (1995) (holding
that the IDEA’s LRE requirement contains a preference for placement in neighborhood school,
but not a mandate).
48 Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist., 14 F.3d at 1404.
49 874 F.2d 1036, 1043 (5th Cir. 1989).
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of the regular or special education program, but rather a continuum of
services.50
Building upon previous court interpretations of the
mainstreaming principle, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit in Oberti v. Board of Education of the Borough of Clementon
School District provided another set of factors in evaluating the
appropriate educational placement.51 This includes evaluating the
steps that the school has taken to include the child in a regular
classroom, as the continuum must include supplementary services such
as a “resource room or itinerant instruction” to expand options beyond
the regular classroom.52 A second factor is evaluating the educational
benefits the child will receive in the regular classroom as compared to
the special education classroom.53 The third factor is an evaluation of
the “possible negative effect the child’s inclusion may have on the
education of the other children in the regular classroom.”54
After considering these factors, if the court determines that the
school district was justified in removing the child from the regular
classroom and providing education in a segregated special education
class, the court must then consider whether the school has included the
child in school programs with nondisabled children to the maximum
extent appropriate.55 This is where the IDEA would mandate schools

50 Id. at 1050 (noting that the appropriate mix of placement options will vary from child to
child). See 34 C.F.R. § 300.551 (2018) (requiring a continuum of alternative placements).
51 995 F.2d 1204, 1217-18 (3d Cir. 1993) (involving an eight year-old with Down’s
Syndrome who was removed from the regular classroom by school officials and placed in a
segregated special education classroom).
52 Id. at 1215 (footnote omitted) (quoting Greer ex rel. Greer v. Rome City Sch. Dist., 950
F.2d 688, 696 (11th Cir. 1991)). The determination should be made as to “whether the school
district has made reasonable efforts to accommodate the children in the regular classroom.”
Id. at 1217.
53 Id. (referring to the special education classroom as “segregated,” implying a less than
desirable placement option). “[I]n making this comparison the court must pay special attention
to those unique benefits the child may obtain from integration in a regular classroom which
cannot be achieved in a segregated environment, i.e., the development of social and
communication skills from interaction with nondisabled peers.” Id. at 1216.
54 Id. at 1217 (emphasizing “that in considering the possible negative effect of the child’s
presence on the other students, the court must keep in mind the school’s obligation under the
[IDEA] to provide supplementary aids and services to accommodate the child’s disabilities”).
55 Id. at 1218. See S.H. v. State-Operated Sch. Dist. of the City of Newark, 336 F.3d 260,
272 (3d Cir. 2003) (adopting a two-prong test to determine whether the school district has
satisfied the mainstreaming requirement: 1) can the school educate the child in the “regular
classroom with use of supplementary aids and services,” and 2) if not, has “the school
mainstream[ed] the child to the maximum extent possible.” (citing Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1215)).
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provide a continuum of alternative placements to meet the needs of the
disabled child.56
On the other hand, there have also been courts that have
questioned the strong preference for education in the regular
classroom. In M.A. ex rel. G.A. v. Voorhees Township Board of
Education, the placement of a child with autism in an out-of-district
placement was viewed as the least restrictive setting, running contrary
to the strong emphasis on education in the regular classroom.57 The
school division successfully argued that the child’s out-of-district
placement was the least restrictive environment in which to receive a
free and appropriate education.58 The child’s current education
involved mainstreaming in homeroom, art, gym, and lunch; however,
the court recognized that the disabled child had minimal to no real
interaction with other peers, something one would expect in the regular
classroom setting.59 Accordingly, the court acknowledged that the
child was not receiving a meaningful educational benefit and that
education at an out-of-district school for children with special needs
comports with the IDEA, and that the child would receive a free and
appropriate education in the LRE through the out-of-district
placement.60 The court cared greatly about the provision of a “free and
appropriate education” (hereinafter “FAPE”), although such an
education may not always be provided in the LRE.61
In Hartmann ex rel. Hartmann v. Loudoun County Board of
Education, an eleven year old autistic child’s parents were seeking
education in the regular classroom and disputed evidence of no
academic progress shown in the regular classroom.62 The Fourth
Circuit recognized the IDEA’s mainstreaming presumption not as an
inflexible federal mandate, and pointed out that disabled children are
56 Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1218 (holding that the appropriate mix between regular and special
education setting “will vary from child to child and . . . from school year to school year as the
child develops” (quoting Daniel R.R. v. State Bd. of Educ., 874 F.2d 1036, 1050 (5th Cir.
1989)).
57 202 F. Supp. 2d 345, 369-70 (D.N.J. 2002).
58 Id. at 370.
59 Id. at 366 (discussing that experts for the parents acknowledged that the child was
receiving “parallel skill development”).
60 Id. at 368-69. See Roncker ex rel. Roncker v. Walter, 700 F.2d 1058, 1063 (6th Cir.
1983) (discussing a preference in favor of mainstreaming).
61 M.A. ex rel. G.A., 202 F. Supp. 2d at 361-62.
62 118 F.3d 996, 1000 (4th Cir. 1997) (explaining that the school recommended placement
in a class of five autistic students, a teacher, and an aid in a regular elementary school which
would allow for mainstreaming in art, music, gym, literacy, and recess).
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to be educated with non-disabled children only to the maximum extent
appropriate.63 This flexibility, inherent in the IDEA placement
provision, is often sorely misinterpreted to pigeonhole disabled
children inappropriately into the regular classroom.
Public schools responsible for educating disabled children
should fully explore an array of placement alternatives before simply
settling on educating the disabled child in the regular classroom. There
is a more complex examination necessary before blindly following the
IDEA encouragement for mainstreaming disabled students. Recently
in 2017, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized this question in an attempt
to search for clarity as to the meaning of an appropriate education.64
In Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas County School District RE1, the parents of an autistic student sought funding for a private school
that specialized in educating children with autism.65 The Court
evaluated the adequacy of the child’s education, explaining in no
uncertain terms that to meet its substantive obligation under the IDEA,
a school “must offer an [individualized education program] reasonably
calculated to enable a child to make progress appropriate in light of the
child’s circumstances.”66 Thus, the IDEA demands more than “de
minimis” progress from year to year.67 This promising and optimistic
approach will hopefully cause school systems to consider more than
the cheapest and easiest way to educate disabled children, which is not
always in the regular classroom to be lost and forgotten.
B.

Mental Health and Involuntary Civil Commitment

In O’Connor v. Donaldson, the U.S. Supreme Court expressed
that the purpose of involuntary hospitalization is the treatment of
mental illness and not simply custodial care or punishment if the
mentally ill person is not a danger to himself or others.68 The minimal
due process protections require that a state “cannot constitutionally
63

Id. at 1001. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(B) (2018).
Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988 (2017). See
Bd. of Educ. of the Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982)
(interpreting the IDEA holding that a deaf student was not entitled to a sign language
interpreter because the child was advancing from grade to grade, and this was evidence that
she was receiving the most appropriate form of education).
65 Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 991.
66 Id. at 999.
67 Id. at 1001.
68 422 U.S. 563, 570 (1975).
64
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confine without more a nondangerous person who is capable of
surviving safely in freedom by himself or with the help of willing and
responsible family members or friends.”69 The Court emphasized that
the confinement of a nondangerous person based upon a diagnosis of
a mental disorder alone lacks constitutional sufficiency.70 The need
for an expansion of out-patient community based mental health
treatment and services is imperative.71 Coupled with the directive in
state civil commitment law is the additional mandate that “[t]here is no
available less restrictive form of intervention consistent with the
welfare and safety of the individual.”72
In the landmark decision of Addington v. Texas, the U.S.
Supreme Court acknowledged that involuntary civil commitment
“constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty,” resulting in adverse
social consequences to the mentally ill individual.73 Recognizing the
significant due process implications of involuntary civil confinement,
the state must establish proof at the civil commitment hearing by a
clear and convincing evidence standard of proof.74
An additional significant bedrock principle of due process
protection for individuals confronted by involuntary civil commitment
is to limit the length of confinement in a psychiatric facility. In
Jackson v. Indiana, the U.S. Supreme Court specifically prohibited
indefinite confinement, asserting that the result violates the Fourteenth
Amendment’s guarantee of due process.75 In the Court’s analysis, it
imposed a rule of reasonableness, mandating that without a showing

69

Id. at 576.
Id. at 575. See Donald H. Stone, Dangerous Minds: Myths and Reality Behind the Violent
Behavior of the Mentally Ill, Public Perceptions, and the Judicial Response Through
Involuntary Civil Commitment, 42 L. & PSYCHOL. REV. 59, 63 (2018) (citing O’Connor, 422
U.S. at 575).
71 Id. at 63-64 (offering recommendations on the danger criterion in civil commitment
hearings).
72 MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 10-632(e)(2)(v) (West 2018).
73 441 U.S. 418, 425-26 (1979) (citing Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972); Humphrey
v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S.
605 (1967)).
74 Addington, 441 U.S. at 433. See Donald H. Stone, There Are Cracks in the Civil
Commitment Process: A Practitioner’s Recommendations to Patch the System, 43 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 789, 818 (2016) (containing recommendations on requiring the burden of proof to
be the more stringent beyond a reasonable doubt standard).
75 Jackson, 406 U.S. at 738.
70
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of dangerousness, a person involuntarily committed could only be held
for a reasonable period of time.76
Several early court decisions have also acknowledged the least
restrictive alternative principle. In Lake v. Cameron,77 the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit examined the duty to explore
alternatives to in-patient hospitalization and noted that “an earnest
effort should be made to review and exhaust available resources in the
community in order to provide care reasonably suited to her needs.”78
In a second case involving the involuntary confinement at Saint
Elizabeth’s Hospital in Washington D.C., the court in Covington v.
Harris noted that the principle of the least restrictive alternative
“inheres in the very nature of civil commitment.”79
The need for in-patient hospitalization is often seen as a last
resort, as the court in Welsch v. Likins recognized the “right of least
restrictive alternatives under the due process clause.”80 The courts
have recognized the widespread acceptance of a constitutional duty by
state officials to explore and provide the least stringent practicable
alternative to confinement of noncriminals.81 The court placed the
burden on the State to make good faith attempts to place persons with
mental illness in suitable and appropriate settings to address their
mental and physical condition while least restrictive on their liberties.82
These early court decisions lay the framework for the concept of the
76

Id. at 733. See also Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated,
414 U.S. 473 (1974) (addressing due process safeguards against unjustified deprivation of
liberty involving such issues as the timely nature of the petition, nature of jury trial rights,
length of detention prior to a hearing, right to counsel, hearsay evidence, and privilege against
self-incrimination).
77 364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966). See Welsch v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487 (D. Minn. 1974)
(holding that state officials are to consider settings that are least restrictive of patients’
liberties).
78 Lake, 364 F.2d at 660. See In re S.L., 462 A.2d 1252, 1258 (N.J. 1983) (holding that the
state shall confine in a setting least restrictive of one’s liberty).
79 419 F.2d 617, 623 (1969). The Covington court also recognized that “[t]he principle of
the least restrictive alternative is equally applicable to alternative dispositions within a mental
hospital.” Id.
80 Welsch, 373 F. Supp. at 501. See also Hickox v. Christie, 205 F. Supp. 3d 579 (D.N.J.
2016).
81 Welsch, 373 F. Supp. at 502.
82 Id. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 93 (1984) (noting that
the “large size of [the institution] prevented it from providing the necessary habitation in the
least restrictive environment”); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 438
(1985) (discussing the ignorance and prejudice that persons with intellectual disabilities were
subjected to through a history of unfair and grotesque mistreatment and the attempt to locate
group homes in community settings).
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LRE that is now commonplace in civil commitment statutes. The U.S.
Supreme Court continued to demonstrate this view by recognizing the
constitutionally protected interests of non-restrictive confinement in
Youngberg v Romeo.83
State civil commitment statutes often highlight the LRE
concept. Some describe the principle as the least restrictive alternative,
as is seen in Alaska in which the term is defined as follows:
“[L]east restrictive alternative” means mental health
treatment facilities and conditions of treatment that
(A) are no more harsh, hazardous, or intrusive than
necessary to achieve the treatment objectives of the
patient; and
(B) involve no restrictions on physical movement nor
supervised residence or inpatient care except as
reasonably necessary for the administration of
treatment or the protection of the patient or others from
physical injury.84
In North Dakota, the least restrictive appropriate setting
requires a “setting that allows an individual with a developmental
disability to develop and realize the individual’s fullest potential and
enhances the individual’s ability to cope with the individual’s
environment.”85
A Pennsylvania regulation emphasizes the
importance of the “proximity of the treatment facility to the person’s
natural environment.”86 Wisconsin factors in the limitation on the
“patient’s freedom of choice and mobility” in the provision of
treatment and services.87
What is commonplace in the LRE criteria in civil commitment
statutes is the requirement that the placement is appropriate and/or

83 457 U.S. 307, 322 (1982) (finding that mentally ill persons are “entitled to minimally
adequate training” in light of the liberty interest “in safety and freedom from unreasonable
restraints”). See Dixon v. Weinberger, 405 F. Supp. 974 (D.D.C. 1975) (one of the first
deinstitutionalization cases, placing the duty of locating an alternative facility on both the
hospital and local government).
84 ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.915(11) (2018). See infra Appendix A for comprehensive list of
state civil commitment statutes highlighting the LRE concept.
85 N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-01.2-01(6) (2018).
86 55 PA. CODE § 5100.2 (2018).
87 WIS. ADMIN. CODE DHS § 94.02(27) (2018).

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol35/iss1/20

14

Stone: Least Restrictive Environment

2019

LEAST RESTRICTIVE ENVIRONMENT

537

available.88 The presence of the LRE being “available” often becomes
a burdensome road block to successful release from an inpatient
psychiatric hospital. As will be fully articulated in this Article’s
recommendation section, the burden is too often wrongfully placed on
the patient rather than the State or in-patient psychiatric facility in
practice.
The LRE concept is also standard in various state assisted
outpatient treatment statutes.89 For instance, New York stipulates that
the physician must state that the treatment plan is the least restrictive
alternative.90 California’s assisted outpatient treatment requires that
“[p]articipation . . . be in the least restrictive placement necessary to
ensure the person’s recovery and stability.”91 Oklahoma’s alternatives
to hospitalization similarly require a statement by the petitioner that
the treatment is the least restrictive alternative.92 As is often seen in
the involuntary civil commitment statutes for inpatient psychiatric
hospitalization, the assisted outpatient treatment statutes also contain
the limitation that the least restrictive alternative is presently available
and appropriate.93 As with the involuntary commitment statutes, the
inclusion of the term “available” causes great challenges and dismay
unless the statute clearly places the burden of persuasion on the State.
C.

Guardianship

In situations where a legal guardian is sought to provide
decision making authority surrounding a disabled person’s
management of his property, medical decisions, and personal matters,
state guardianship statutes often express the desire to respect the least
restrictive form of intervention.94 In Wisconsin, for example, the
88 E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-540(b) (2018); 55 PA. CODE § 5100.2; 405 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/3-811(a) (2018); LA. STAT. ANN. § 28:55(e)(1) (2018); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 330.1708
(2018).
89 See infra notes 90-93.
90 N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.60(i)(3) (McKinney 2018). See also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:427.15a(a) (West 2018) (“[T]he court shall consider the least restrictive environment for the
patient to receive clinically appropriate treatment.”).
91 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5346(a)(7) (West 2018). See also N.M. STAT. ANN. § 431B-3(e) (West 2018) (“[T]he person . . . is in need of assisted outpatient treatment as the least
restrictive appropriate alternative to prevent a relapse or deterioration likely to result in serious
harm to self or likely to result in serious harm to others.”).
92 OKLA. STAT. tit. 43A § 5-416(I) (2018).
93 See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 202A.0815(4) (West 2018).
94 See infra notes 95-97.
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powers of guardianship of the estate must be guided by a consideration
of the “least restrictive form of intervention of the ward.”95
Furthermore, in a 2010 dispute in Tennessee between a daughter and
her elderly father, the state Court of Appeals utilized the state statute
mandating an imposition of the least restrictive environment in the
analysis of the father’s need for a guardian.96 Similarly, the Missouri
Court of Appeals showed great deference in a close case to the dignity
and personhood of a disabled person in applying the LRE principle in
refusing to appoint a legal guardian.97 In short, the LRE finds a
prominent place when a disabled person faces the loss of autonomy
and decision making authority.
D.

Community Based Group Homes

Long before the Olmstead mandate of community based
treatment, mental health advocates had long fought for the less
restrictive environment principle for mental health treatment. The
ADA and the Fair Housing Act98 added legal might to the LRE, shining
the spotlight on the importance of requiring persons with disabilities
to receive public services and accommodations in the most integrated
setting appropriate to meet their needs, and ensuring the right to fully
participate in all aspects of society.99
Several studies have examined the delivery of services to
people with disabilities.100 A National Council on Disability report in
2015 examined the research on the impact of the size and types of

95

WIS. STAT. § 54.20(1) (2018). See also ALASKA STAT. § 13.26.301 (2018) (stating that a
guardian is appointed “only the authority that is least restrictive upon the liberty of the
[ward]”).
96 Todd v. Justice, No. E2009-02346-COA-R3-CV, 2010 WL 2350568, at *8 (Tenn. Ct.
App. June 14, 2010) (“The court has an affirmative duty to ascertain and impose the least
restrictive alternatives upon the disabled person.” (quoting TENN. CODE ANN. § 34-1-127)).
97 Nelson v. Nelson, 891 S.W.2d 181 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) (refusing to take a strict
paternalistic approach). See also D.C. CODE § 21-2045.01(c)(4) (2018) (requiring the
appointment of a guardian that is the least restrictive guardianship order appropriate for the
ward).
98 Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81 (1968) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619).
99 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2) (2018); ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325,
122 Stat. 3553 (2008).
100 Home and Community-Based Services: Creating Systems for Success at Home, at Work
and in the Community, NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, https://www.ncd.gov/rawmedia_repo
sitory/HCBS%20Report_FINAL.pdf (last visited Nov. 29, 2018) (reviewing the impact of the
Olmstead decision by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1999).
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community settings on outcomes for people with disabilities.101 The
results supported the proposition that “smaller, more dispersed and
individualized community settings further integration and positive
outcomes for individuals with disabilities.”102 This report also
provided important recommendations to states regarding community
settings, including:
(1) limiting residence setting size;103
(2) quality management;104
(3) financial alignment across current funding, resource
and rate setting, setting of system goals, and the current
HCBS regulations;105
(4) assuring stakeholder engagement throughout the
planning and implementation of plans, processes, and
programs;106
(5) oversight that enhances provider expectations about
qualifications, training, and giving necessary services
and supports;107 and
(6) expansion of opportunities that promote selfdetermination and consumer control in living
alternatives across the broad array of people with
disabilities receiving federal benefits.108
The report highlighted the LRE principle through the use of the
Medicaid waiver program in 1981, which laid the foundation for
“people with even the most intensive service needs [to] effectively be
supported in small, non-restrictive integrated community settings.”109
The report also focused on the benefits of integrating persons with

101

Id. at 22-30.
Id. at 7.
103 Id. at 9. The report also notes that a majority of U.S. studies reported that programs
utilizing smaller residence sizes showed better outcomes. Id. at 28.
104 Id. at 9. The report recommends data collection to track systems performance. Id. at 60.
105 Id. at 9. The report encourages provider reimbursement practices that “support service
delivery in the most integrated setting.” Id. at 60.
106 Id. at 9. The report suggests establishing relationships with families and disability
advocates to advise on policy issues. Id. at 61.
107 Id. at 9. Staff should receive “adequate training to provide effective services.” Id. at 61.
108 Id. at 9. The report encourages “self-directed, consumer controlled living alternatives.”
Id. at 61.
109 Id. at 12. The Omnibus Budget & Reconciliation Act of 1981 is the primary mechanism
for community based services. Id. at 14.
102
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disabilities into society and the resulting better quality of life outcomes
across such areas as community participation and housing stability.110
There are studies that demonstrate that although community
residential homes for persons with disabilities have “no negative
impact on the surrounding neighborhood[,] . . . the accommodation of
these group homes in residential districts remains a controversial
issue.”111 An important recommendation to local governments to
ensure that local zoning ordinances do not raise barriers for inclusion
of group homes for the disabled and aging populations is to classify
such homes for residential uses, as opposed to commercial
properties.112 In addition, the Department of Health and Human
Services Office for Civil Rights (hereinafter “OCR”), the office
responsible for investigating complaints alleging a violation of the
ADA’s integration regulation, must continue its efforts to move
persons with disabilities from institutional facilities to the
community.113 Such an investigation process will ensure compliance
with the Olmstead decree, as well as with the ADA mandate promoting
the LRE.114
A common trend in this arena is the unfortunate concept known
as “not in my backyard” (hereinafter “NIMBY”), whereby local
residents strongly oppose the location of alcohol and drug treatment
facilities in their community.115 This outcry is often extended to
community resistance to locating mental health services and housing

110 Id. at 17-18. See Florence D. DiGennaro Reed et al., Barriers to Independent Living for
Individuals with Disabilities and Seniors, 7 ASS’N FOR BEHAV. ANALYSIS INT’L 70, 70 (2014),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4711747/pdf/40617_2014_Article_11.pdf
(“[A]dults usually enjoy greater choice when they live in their own homes relative to
individuals living in congregate care or group home settings.”). Barriers to independent living
include personal safety, household skills, and medication assistance. Id. at 74.
111 Michele B. McGlyn & Donald L. Elliott, Group Home Regulations under State and
Federal Law, 35 COLO. LAW. 37, 38 (2006).
112 Id. at 38.
113 Delivering on the Promise: OCR’s Compliance Activities Promote Community
Integration, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES (Sept. 2006), https://www.hhs.gov/civilrights/for-individuals/special-topics/community-living-and-olmstead/compliance-activitiespromote-integration/index.html.
114 Id. See Disability Advocates, Inc. v. Paterson, 598 F. Supp. 2d 289 (E.D.N.Y. 2009)
(involving an organization alleging violations of the ADA integration mandate on behalf of
mentally ill persons living in state-licensed adult homes).
115 Amanda Habermann, Not In My Backyard: Communities Resist Mental Health, and
Alcohol and Drug Treatment Facilities, SOVEREIGN HEALTH, https://www.sovhealth.com/edit
orials/not-in-my-backyard/not-backyard-communities-resist-mental-health-alcohol-drugtreatment-facilities/ (last visited Nov. 29, 2018).
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in the local residents’ community.116 Based largely on unfounded fears
and negative stereotypes, NIMBY promotes discrimination and
stigmatization of people with physical or mental illnesses.117
There are important sociological reasons for integrating group
homes for persons with physical or mental disabilities within
residential settings in the community. Such benefits include
community integration, educating the community about stigmatized
populations, and even the deterrence of crime near group homes
because residents are specifically required to maintain positive
behavior and are vigilant of this fact.118
An interesting and compelling 2016 study explored this issue
of whether drug treatment centers actually bring more crime to a
neighborhood, and revealed that the public anxiety about such facilities
is not borne out by the data.119 The study showed that violent crime is
more likely to be present near a liquor store or corner store than a drug
treatment center.120 By comparing crimes that arose at fifty-three
methadone treatment programs with crimes near liquor stores and
convenience stores, the study proved that “[t]here [were] significantly
more rapes, homicides, assaults, and robberies near the stores” as
compared to the methadone clinics.121

116

Id.
Id. (“While many residents fear that alcohol and drug treatment facilities will increase
crime rates due to the established link between substance abuse and crime, there is no evidence
that suggests that people with [substance use disorders] who receive adequate treatment are
any more likely to commit crimes than other people in the general population.”).
118 Leonard A. Jason et al., Counteracting ‘Not in My Backyard’: The Positive Effects of
Greater Occupancy within Mutual-help Recovery Homes, 36 J. COMMUNITY PSYCHOL. 947
(2008).
119 Dale Keiger, Do Drug Treatment Centers Bring More Crime to a Neighborhood?, JOHN
HOPKINS MAG., Spring 2016, https://hub.jhu.edu/magazine/2016/spring/nimby-drugtreament-centers/ (citing C. Debra M. Furr-Holden et al., Not in My Back Yard: A Comparative
Analysis of Crime Around Publicly Funded Drug Treatment Centers, Liquor Stores,
Convenience Stores, and Corner Stores in One Mid-Atlantic City, 77 J. STUD. ON ALCOHOL &
DRUGS 17 (2016) (recognizing that “[d]rug treatment centers are a public health need” and as
“necessary as urgent care centers and emergency department” (alteration in original))).
120 Id.
See also Jeff Deeney, “A Methadone Clinic? Not in My Neighborhood!”,
SUBSTANCE.COM (Jan. 16, 2015), https://www.substance.com/a-methadone-clinic-not-in-myneighborhood/.
121 Methadone Treatment Programs—NIMBY or Not?, MEDMARK TREATMENT CENTERS
(Feb. 5, 2016), https://medmark.com/methadone-treatment-programs-nimby-or-not/ (citing
Furr-Holden et al., supra note 119). See also Brandon Duncan, “Not in My Backyard” Views
Hinder Efforts to Curb Addiction Epidemic, STEPWORKS RECOVERY CTR. (Nov. 30, 2016),
http://www.stepworks.com/2016/11/30/nimby-opposition-to-addiction-treatment-facilitiesups-risks/ (discussing local county ordinances that place strict limits on locating addiction
117
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Disability Rights California issued another important report
addressing NIMBY in 2014.122 The recommendations include
encouraging state and local government to “support efforts to reduce
stigma against people with mental health disabilities” and to “promote
funding for affordable housing and supportive services.”123 In
addition, the report recommends encouraging the state to promote
supportive housing to individuals with mental health disabilities at risk
of institutionalization and to encourage local authorities to utilize
zoning ordinances to discourage “NIMBYism.”124
The importance of enabling individuals with disabilities to
interact with non-disabled persons to the fullest extent possible is a
foundational principle of the LRE concept. Such integrated settings
offer individuals with disabilities opportunities to reside, work and
obtain supportive services in the community as individuals without
disabilities do.125 Scattered-site housing with supportive services, as
opposed to congregate settings populated exclusively or primarily with
persons with disabilities, provides a more integrated setting.126
The U.S. Department of Justice (hereinafter “DOJ”) Civil
Rights Division is tasked with enforcement of the integration mandate
of the ADA and compliance with the Olmstead mandate.127 In
addition, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development
(hereinafter “HUD”) plays an important role in increasing efforts to
move individuals out of institutions and into integrated community
settings.128 HUD directives require states to take the lead in offering a
range of housing options in a community setting with “substantial
opportunities for individuals with disabilities to live and interact with
treatment facilities, negatively resulting in their location away from residential areas to
shopping centers).
122 DISABILITY RIGHTS CAL., EVERYONE’S NEIGHBORHOOD: ADDRESSING “NOT IN MY
BACKYARD” OPPOSITION TO SUPPORTIVE HOUSING FOR PEOPLE WITH MENTAL HEALTH
DISABILITIES (2014), https://www.disabilityrightsca.org/system/files/file-attachments/CM530
1.pdf.
123 Id. at 7.
124 Id.
125 U.S. DEP’T JUST.: C.R. DIVISION, STATEMENT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ON
ENFORCEMENT OF INTEGRATION MANDATE OF TITLE II OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES
ACT AND OLMSTEAD V. L.C. (2011), https://www.ada.gov/olmstead/q&a_olmstead.htm
[hereinafter DOJ and Olmstead].
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 U.S. DEP’T OF HOUSING & URBAN DEVELOPMENT, STATEMENT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT ON THE ROLE OF HOUSING IN ACCOMPLISHING THE GOALS
OF OLMSTEAD 1 (2013), https://www.hud.gov/sites/documents/olmsteadguidnc060413.pdf.
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individuals without disabilities.”129 Also within HUD’s wheelhouse,
the Fair Housing Act (hereinafter “FHA”) is clearly intended to
promote such integration in the housing arena in order to accomplish
the goals of Olmstead.130 It is clear that integrated settings are best
found in “mainstream society,” which includes access to community
activities and opportunities, affords the individual a choice in daily
activities, and offers opportunities for interaction between disabled and
non-disabled individuals “to the fullest extent possible.”131 These
principles highlight the nature and substance of the LRE concept.
Overwhelming evidence has demonstrated that permitting
individuals with disabilities to reside in a family-like setting in the
community is not only less expensive than institutionalization, but is
also substantially more effective and teaches important life skills.132
E.

Architectural Accessibility

The LRE is also prevalent in the architectural design and
construction of public places.133 The ADA prohibits discrimination on
the “basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of goods,
services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any
place of public accommodation.”134 The ADA mandate of inclusion
prohibits a public accommodation from offering disabled persons
“opportunit[ies] to participate in or benefit from” the goods and
services that are not “equal to [those] afforded to other individuals.”135
The inclusion obligation prohibits a “different or separate” benefit to
persons with disabilities “unless such action is necessary.”136 The
ADA promotes public accommodations affording goods and services

129

Id. at 4.
Id. at 9.
131 DOJ and Olmstead, supra note 125.
132 APA Policy Guide on Community Residences, AM. PLAN. ASS’N (Sept. 22, 1997),
https://www.planning.org/policy/guides/adopted/commres.htm (highlighting the importance
of locating community residences in the “same residential zoning districts as dwellings
occupied by biological families”).
133 See infra notes 134-41.
134 28 C.F.R. § 36.201(a) (2018). A place of public accommodation means “a facility
operated by a private entity whose operations affect commerce and fall within” one of twelve
categories including places of lodging, restaurants, movie theaters, museums, and places of
recreation. Id. § 36.104.
135 Id. § 36.202(b).
136 Id. § 36.202(c).
130
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to individuals with disabilities “in the most integrated setting
appropriate to the needs of the individual.”137
There have been challenges in the context of public
accommodations, specifically to relegating disabled persons to the
back of the theater, as was seen in Fiedler v. American Multi-Cinema,
Inc.138 The allegation in Fiedler was that the movie theater deprived
the disabled wheelchair user of the full and equal enjoyment of the
facility, and the plaintiff sought seating dispersed throughout the
theater.139 The court denied summary judgment on the basis that
determining whether dispersed wheelchair seating would pose a
danger to other patrons in the case of an emergency demanded a factspecific assessment.140 Nonetheless, the court’s analysis recognized
the importance of architectural accessibility for disabled individuals in
public accommodations.141
One possible solution to these recurring issues is the increase
in use of universal design. In contrast to “accessible design,” whereby
the needs of disabled individuals are specifically considered, and
“usable design,” whereby specialized products are created for efficient
use, universal design incorporates “products and environments to be
usable by all people . . . without the need for adaption or specialized
design.”142 Utilizing universal design is the purest form of inclusion
because it serves to benefit all people, and not just those who are
“average” or “typical.”143 The use of universal design in addressing
persons with “mobility, agility, and perceptual acuity” is an important

137

Id. § 36.203(a).
871 F. Supp. 35, 36 (D.D.C. 1994) (discussing plaintiff’s claim that the placement of
wheelchair seating in the rear of the theater “relegat[ed] him to inferior seating”).
139 Id. The court ultimately denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, holding
that, although seats should be dispersed under the ADA, an “individualized assessment” of the
facts was necessary to ensure safety of all patrons in the case of an emergency. Id. at 39. See
United States v. Hoyts Cinemas Corp., 380 F.3d 558 (1st Cir. 2004) (challenging “lines of
sight” in stadium theater seating for wheelchair-bound individuals).
140 Fiedler, 871 F. Supp. at 40.
141 Id. at 37-40.
142 What is the Difference Between Accessible, Usable and Universal Design?,
DISABILITIES, OPPORTUNITIES, INTERNETWORKING, & TECH., https://www.washington.edu/doi
t/what-difference-between-accessible-usable-and-universal-design (last updated Sept. 15,
2017). Examples of universal design include automatically opening doors at grocery stores or
sidewalks with “curb cuts.” Id.
143 Id.
138
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design principle for architects, and should be more frequently
considered.144
Planning and designing for persons with disabilities is crucial
to making inclusion a reality. The promise of inclusion within places
of public accommodations will by necessity require creative and
thoughtful architects and planners to address the needs presented by
persons with disabilities seeking acceptance and full participation in
all society has to offer.
F.

Termination of Parental Rights

The least restrictive alternative principle is also commonly seen
in family law in termination of parental rights (hereinafter “TPR”)
proceedings.145 In situations when a parent neglects, abuses, or
abandons a child and the State’s protective services apparatus
intervenes, courts are guided by the LRE principle to ensure that TPR
is a last resort.146 For instance, in C.V.T. v. Department of Children
and Family Services, the court reversed the termination of the mother’s
parental rights due to the failure of the Department of Children and
Family Services to establish that termination was the least restrictive
means of preventing harm to the child in question.147 Similarly, in a
second case involving TPR, a Florida court in In re Z.C. highlighted
the least restrictive means test.148 The court recognized the importance
of the least restrictive mandate in finding that the Department of
Children and Family Services must prove that termination is the least
restrictive way to protect the child.149 It is evident that the
determination of what is in the best interest of the child is guided by
the least restrictive alternative decision in far reaching areas of the law
and public policy initiatives.
144 Allen C. Abend, Planning and Designing for Students with Disabilities, NAT’L
CLEARINGHOUSE FOR EDUC. FACILITIES 2 (2001), http://www.ncef.org/pubs/disabilities.pdf.
145 See infra notes 147-49 and accompanying text.
146 See infra notes 147-49 and accompanying text.
147 843 So. 2d 366, 368 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (“If the Mother were able to continue
making progress towards recovery, termination would not be the least restrictive means of
preventing harm to the child.”). See In re R.J.M., 266 S.E.2d 114, 114 (W. Va. 1980)
(discussing the least restrictive alternative regarding TPR and how “courts are not required to
exhaust every speculative possibility of parental improvement”).
148 88 So. 3d 977, 987 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (noting that the trial court misapplied the
least restrictive means test by basing its decision to be terminated solely on the availability of
the alternative placement).
149 Id. at 988.
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WHERE WE GO FROM HERE?: A NEW FOCUS OF SPECIAL
EDUCATION

During nearly forty years since the passage of the Education
for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, children with disabilities
have been integrated or mainstreamed in large numbers and in various
ways.150 However, this shift has also brought various challenges and
unanswered questions.
Should the presumption of providing
appropriate special education for children with disabilities in the
regular classroom continue to be the first option of choice? Why not
start with the middle option within the range of alternatives, the
suitable choice of placement in the mainstream, regular classroom part
of the day and placement in a special education class the other part of
the day? Placement decisions should begin here first, and movement
to a less restrictive setting or a more restrictive setting would be
contingent on the individualized education program (hereinafter
“IEP”) meeting resulting in the appropriate placement setting.
The IDEA sets forth a requirement that school divisions ensure
a continuum of alternative placement options to meet the unique needs
of children with disabilities.151 This cascade model of special
education services ranges “from the least restrictive placement in the
regular education classroom to the most restrictive placement in a
hospital or institutional setting.”152 The cascade model “facilitates
tailoring of treatment” of the degree of placement specialization and
the maximum number of children in the various placement options.153
The model envisions placement in the regular educational classroom
as the “primary and optimal setting,” and a child would be moved to a
more restrictive setting only for “compelling educational reasons and .
. . moved back as quickly as possible.”154 First established by Evelyn
Deno in 1970, this system provides seven levels, ranging from

150

See supra Section IV.A.
34 C.F.R. § 300.115(a) (2018). For example, in Maryland, the continuum of alternative
placements must be available to the extent necessary to implement the IEP. Md. Code Regs.
13A.05.01.10(B) (2018).
152 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SPECIAL EDUCATION: A REFERENCE FOR THE EDUCATION OF
CHILDREN, ADOLESCENTS, AND ADULTS WITH DISABILITIES AND OTHER EXCEPTIONAL
INDIVIDUALS 362-63 (Cecil R. Reynolds & Elaine Fletcher-Janzen eds., 3d ed. 2007).
153 Id. at 362 (quoting Evelyn Deno, Special Education as Developmental Capital, 37
EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 229, 235 (1970)).
154 Id.
151
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education in the regular classroom to hospital or in-patient residential
settings as follows:
Level 1: Children in regular classes . . . with or without
medical or counseling supportive therapies.
Level 2: Regular class attendance plus supplementary
instructional services
Level 3: Part-time special class
Level 4: Full-time special class
Level 5: Special stations
Level 6: Homebound
Level 7: Instruction in hospital or domiciled setting [inpatient programs]155
The IDEA starting point is level one, in that it requires that
“appropriate special education and related services, and aids and
supports,” whenever appropriate, are provided for in the regular
classroom.156 Rather than starting placement discussions at level one
and moving to other options when necessary to provide appropriate
education, the discussion between parents and school officials should
instead begin at level 3, the setting whereby a disabled student spends
the primary part of the day in the regular classroom and is taught for
three hours or less per day in the special education class.157
The special education class would be dramatically reduced in
class size with teachers specifically trained in special education.158
This bold proposal, starting at level 3 rather than the current default of
level 1, would result in more varied educational settings offered for all
students with disabilities. While it is true that education in the regular
classroom may offer social benefits to the disabled child,159 and surely
it is less costly to the school district than level 3 or 4,160 tossing disabled

155 Deno, supra note 153 (“The most specialized facilities are likely to be needed by the
fewest children on a long term basis.”).
156 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(5)(D) (2018).
157 Deno, supra note 153.
158 REBECCA A. HINES, INCLUSION IN MIDDLE SCHOOLS 4-5 (2001), https://files.eric.ed.gov/f
ulltext/ED459000.pdf.
159 CAROL A. KOCHHAR ET AL., SUCCESSFUL INCLUSION: PRACTICAL STRATEGIES FOR A
SHARED RESPONSIBILITY (2d ed. 1999).
160 Lori Garrett-Hatfield, The Cost of Mainstreaming Vs. Special Education Classes,
CAREER TREND, https://careertrend.com/the-cost-of-mainstreaming-vs-special-education-clas
ses-12067245.html (last updated July 21, 2017). Educating a student with disabilities costs
on average almost twice as much as educating a typical non-disabled student. Jay G.
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children into a regular classroom environment as a default without
consideration for their individualized circumstances may in fact be
doing them a disservice.
In order to ensure that the inclusion mandate is respected,
flexibility should be paramount in the placement discussion. This
discussion may very well lead to the ultimate placement result at level
1; however, starting at the middle of the scale, rather than the extreme
end, will lead to a more detailed and fuller discussion of creative
options. Placing children with disabilities routinely in the regular
classroom as the presumptive choice, without significant thought and
discussion of alternatives, may prove to be an unwise and short-sighted
model.
There are voices of discontent rising up in various communities
against the notion of default inclusion. For instance, members of the
special education teaching community have voiced opposition.161 As
is seen in “Special Education: The Myth of the Least Restrictive
Environment,” Dr. Steven Simpson opines that classrooms filled with
thirty kids, four or five who are special education students, is
frustrating for the teacher.162 Trying to serve special education
students in the regular classroom in an overcrowded setting with
teachers who may be untrained in special education is a recipe for
failure.163 For school divisions to be laser-focused on placement in the
regular classroom for disabled students as the first choice option may
result in roadblocks for other more appropriate and unique initiatives
to be seriously considered.
The deaf/hard-of-hearing (hereinafter “DHH”) community is
particularly vocal in their opposition to mainstreaming as the default
setting.164 Their needs are unique in that the typical school curriculum
Chambers et al., What Are We Spending on Special Education Services in the United States,
1999-2000?, AM. INSTITUTES FOR RES. (June 2004), https://www.air.org/sites/default/files/SE
EP1-What-Are-We-Spending-On.pdf.
161 See infra notes 162-63.
162 Steven W. Simpson, Special Education: The Myth of the Least Restrictive Environment
(Nov. 1, 2005), BRIDGES4KIDS, https://www.bridges4kids.org/articles/2005/11-05/Simpson11
-1-05.html (discussing how reducing the class size to 15 rather than 30 is a monetary problem).
163 Id. See Kristie Lauren Trifiolis, LRE Under the IDEA: Has Mainstreaming Gone Too
Far?, SETON HALL L. SCH. STUDENT SCHOLARSHIP (May 1, 2014), http://scholarship.shu.edu/
cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1594&context=student_scholarship (noting that not all disabled
students can benefit from mainstreaming, class sizes are too large, teachers are poorly
prepared, and non-disabled students may be neglected).
164 Kevin T. Williams, Least Restrictive Environment (LRE) and Deaf Students, NAT’L
TECHNICAL INST. FOR THE DEAF (Apr. 1, 2016), http://www.raisingandeducatingdeafchildren.
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is grounded and designed in spoken language skills.165 For this reason,
the regular classroom is “arguably restrictive in that it is not designed
for DHH children.”166 In response to a 1988 report that recommended
various changes to how the federal education system supports deaf
students, the Department of Education issued policy guidelines in 1992
that highlighted the difficulties faced by deaf students in obtaining a
FAPE.167 In these guidelines, the Department stressed that additional
factors may need to be considered in developing an IEP for these
students.168 The deaf community is also unique among many other
disabled individuals in that deafness is often not viewed as a disability
at all, but instead as a cultural experience with a common language
(e.g., ASL), community, and values.169 Placing DHH children who
identify this way in the regular classroom is akin to placing a nonEnglish speaker in an English speaking class and expecting him to
achieve at the same level as native speakers.170
Some critics of the LRE in the special education setting also
point to concerns of race and class inequalities. It is clear that lower
resource schools invest less in special education staffing and certain
special education services as compared to higher resource schools.171
When only limited services are available, “an availability inquiry may
find that the student needs a more restrictive placement simply because
the lower-achieving school has not made needed services available.”172
org/2016/04/01/least-restrictive-environment-lre-and-deaf-students/. See Lamar Alexander,
Deaf Students Education Services, U.S. DEP’T EDUC.: OFF. FOR C.R., Oct. 26, 1992,
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/hq9806.html (expressing concern that deaf
students have significant obstacles to overcome in order to have access to FAPE, particularly
with regard to communication needs).
165 Williams, supra note 164.
166 Id.
167 Alexander, supra note 164. Leeanne Seaver, Deaf is Different: Educational Impacts
and Cultural Perspectives, HANDS & VOICES, http://www.handsandvoices.org/articles/educati
on/law/different.html (last visited Nov. 29, 2018).
168 Alexander, supra note 164 (factors include “1. Communication needs and the child’s
and family’s preferred mode of communication; 2. Linguistic needs; 3. Severity of hearing
loss and potential for using residual hearing; 4. Academic level; and 5. Social, emotional, and
cultural needs including opportunities for peer interactions and communication”).
169 Seaver, supra note 167.
170 Id.
171 Cari Carson, Rethinking Special Education’s “Least Restrictive Environment”
Requirement, 113 MICH. L. REV. 1397, 1408-09 (2015) (citing JAY G. CHAMBERS ET AL., CTR.
FOR SPECIAL EDUC. FIN., DISTRICT REVENUES AND STUDENT POVERTY: IMPLICATIONS FOR
SPECIAL EDUCATION RESOURCES AND SERVICES 3-4 (1995), http://csef.air.org/publications/cse
f/briefs/brief5.pdf).
172 Id. at 1409.
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This may then lead to low-income students being pigeonholed into
inappropriate placements and lost within the system for the duration of
their education.173 To make matters worse, children in these lowincome school districts are also disproportionately students of color.174
Parents of disabled children are also not entirely in support of
the mainstream concept. Frequently, “parents run in the opposite
direction” of the LRE, “seeking education in specialized programs.”175
“Integration for integration’s sake,” once seen as a valid concern to
combat rampant discrimination, is “no longer perceived as a pressing
one.”176
Furthermore, integration is often illusory, with “only token
interaction at a distance” between general students and disabled
students.177 Education advocates are recognizing that the LRE
mandate must be considered in the context of the Endrew F. directive
that “school[s] must offer [education that is] reasonably calculated to
enable a child to make progress appropriate in light of the child’s
circumstances.”178 The more demanding standard of educational
progress is greater than the “merely more than de minimis” test of the
past.179 There are no longer the grave concerns of disabled students
being excluded completely from educational programs, as was seen in
the early days of the passage of the IDEA.180 Today, students with
disabilities are demanding and expecting an educational program that
will give them every opportunity to fulfill their potential.
Despite these objections, the benefits of mainstreaming should
not be ignored when it is indeed appropriate and productive for the
disabled student to be placed in the regular classroom. Many
educational specialists highlight the benefits of mainstreaming for the
disabled student, the students without disabilities, and the teacher.181
For example, the National Longitudinal Transition Study reviewed the

173

Id.
Id. at 1408 (citing CHILDREN’S DEF. FUND, THE STATE OF AMERICA’S CHILDREN 34-35
(2014), http://www.childrensdefense.org/library/state-of-americas-children/2014-soac.pdf).
175 Bonnie Spiro Schinagle & Marilyn J. Bartlett, The Strained Dynamic of the Least
Restrictive Environment Concept in the IDEA, 35 CHILD. LEGAL RTS. J. 229, 230 (2015).
176 Id. at 249.
177
Id. at 247; Ruth Colker, The Disability Integration Presumption: Thirty Years Later, 154
U. PA. L. REV. 789, 799-800 (2006).
178 Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988, 999 (2017).
179 Id. at 1000.
180 Id. at 999.
181 See infra note 182.
174
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educational outcomes of 11,000 students with disabilities and found
that “more time spent in a general education classroom was positively
correlated with: a) fewer absences from school, b) fewer referrals for
disruptive behavior, and c) better outcomes after high school in the
areas of employment and independent living.”182 Moreover, students
without disabilities made greater gains in math and reading when
taught in inclusive settings.183
Research has indicated that students with disabilities benefit
from inclusion, resulting in more appropriate social behavior, higher
levels of achievement, and improved ability of students and teachers
to adapt to different teaching and learning styles.184 However,
researchers have also found that removing the barriers to inclusion
requires smaller class sizes and additional, properly trained teachers.185
One challenge is that many teachers are not sufficiently prepared to
work in an inclusive setting.186 The necessary collaboration among
teachers requires “a shift in control and sharing of a learning
environment rather than having individual space, both concepts
foreign to the traditionally trained teacher.”187 Nonetheless, there has
been criticism of the inclusion model, ranging from “low self-esteem
of students with disabilities” to “poor academic grades.”188
The importance of significantly smaller class sizes and
enhanced teacher training is pivotal in order for the inclusion model to
be beneficial to students with disabilities. The fear of the disabled
student being lost in the shuffle and not receiving appropriate
educational benefits continues to be a concern for parents and
educators.189
The need for greater funding expenditures for
educational programs is also a necessity. Significant research
182

Xuan Bui et al., Inclusive Education Research & Practice, MD. COALITION FOR
INCLUSIVE EDUC. 2 (2010), http://docplayer.net/15573125-Inclusive-education-researchpractice.html (citing MARY WAGNER ET AL., THE ACADEMIC ACHIEVEMENT AND FUNCTIONAL
PERFORMANCE OF YOUTH WITH DISABILITIES: A REPORT FROM THE NATIONAL LONGITUDINAL
TRANSITION STUDY-2 (NLTS2), NAT’L CTR. FOR SPECIAL EDUC. RES. ix-xii (2006),
https://ies.ed.gov/ncser/pdf/20063000.pdf.).
183 Id. at 3.
184 KOCHHAR ET AL., supra note 159.
185 HINES, supra note 158.
186
Id. at 5.
187 Id. (“[A]ccepting new ideas about teaching, learning, and learning styles is called for
and not always embraced by teachers.”).
188 Id. Another criticism is the lack of training for teachers in the general education setting.
Id.
189 Schinagle & Bartlett, supra note 175, at 230.
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demonstrates that disabled students require the opportunity to
“[d]evelop positive social-emotional skills,” “[a]cquire and use
knowledge and skills,” and “[u]se appropriate behaviors to meet their
own needs.”190 Inclusion settings offer greater opportunities for social
and emotional development.191 Although research shows that included
children demonstrate academic gains, one would still wonder whether
a mix of educational settings with part of the day spent in a specialized
class with significantly fewer students (less than 26) and teachers with
specialized training (hereinafter “mixed classroom setting”) could
offer even better academic outcomes for disabled students.192
The mixed classroom setting might offer even greater academic
success without sacrificing the social and emotional benefits an
inclusive setting can provide. This educational alternative should be
more frequently considered before disabled students are placed all day,
every day, in a mainstream setting that may not be best for them.
Recognizing this alternative may be an unpopular proposition, but the
discussion of educational placement options should start with the
mixed classroom setting, and then move along the continuum as
appropriate. The placement alternative along the cascade system
should permit easy movement to a less restrictive or more restrictive
setting, depending on the unique needs of the disabled child.
One must not lose sight of the fundamental principle of the
IDEA, which creates a presumption in favor of integrating children
with disabilities, to the maximum extent appropriate, into the regular
classroom.193 Although the mainstreaming goal is laudable, it cannot
be achieved uniformly, and may in certain circumstances actually
violate the IDEA itself.194 The emphasis must be on the necessity that
the educational program appropriately meets the child’s needs.

190

WILLIAM R. HENNINGER, IV & SARIKA S. GUPTA, FIRST STEPS TO PRESCHOOL INCLUSION:
HOW TO JUMPSTART YOUR PROGRAMWIDE P LAN 37 (2014), http://archive.brookespublishing.c
om/documents/gupta-how-children-benefit-from-inclusion.pdf.
191
Id. at 40.
192 Id. at 40-41.
193 A.G. ex rel. S.G. v. Wissahickon Sch. Dist., 374 F. App’x 330, 333 (3d Cir. 2010).
194 See Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist. v. Wartenberg ex rel. Wartenberg, 59 F.3d 884, 897
(9th Cir. 1995) (holding that “where separate teaching would produce superior results” to
mainstreaming, mainstreaming is neither appropriate nor satisfactory).
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THE LRE PRINCIPLE IN INVOLUNTARY CIVIL COMMITMENT

When a person with a mental illness is allegedly a danger to
themselves or others, an in-patient psychiatric facility is often the
placement of choice unless there is a less restrictive setting that is
appropriate.195 An additional burden facing a person with a mental
illness is that judges often find that the less restrictive setting must be
readily available.196 The question of who has the burden to prove that
the LRE is not available and how much proof is actually necessary to
meet this burden is less than clear in practice.
What is sufficient evidence to show that the LRE setting
outside an in-patient psychiatric hospital is unavailable? Does the
hospital, state, or local jurisdiction have the burden to present clear and
convincing evidence that no LRE is available? What if the primary
reason for no LRE being available is due to lack of funding? What if
it is less expensive to offer a community based treatment plan? Should
that be satisfactory to the judge in determining placement options? Is
it a lost cause to advocate for an LRE if such an option is not currently
available because the state’s mental health apparatus has chosen not to
create such a community based model? Are we approaching the
question in an individual case-by-case way when what is necessary is
a systemic overhaul of funding for mental health treatment?
All too often, mental health policymakers and decisionmakers
determine the placement of individuals with mental illness on the basis
of what is currently available in the local community rather than on the
basis of what would appropriately meet their needs.197 The pressing
demand for community based alternatives, including treatment and
housing, must be appropriately funded to make the appropriate LRE
available more frequently in a community setting rather than a hospital
setting. State governments must take the lead in funding these much
needed community based options and local housing alternatives. Only
then will the LRE become more than an empty promise for persons
with mental illness.

195
196
197

See infra Appendix A.
See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
See infra Appendix A. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 202B.040(3) (West 2018).
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Treatment of Substance Abuse

The continuum of alternative settings is also a guiding principle
in the treatment of substance abuse and addiction.198 The stated “goal
is to place patients in the least restrictive environment that is still safe
and effective and then move them along a continuum of care as they
demonstrate capacity and motivation to cooperate with treatment.”199
The continuum of treatment settings range from the most intensive to
least, including “inpatient hospitalization, residential treatment,
intensive outpatient treatment, and outpatient treatment.”200 The least
restrictive care ensures patients’ civil rights and their right to choice of
care.201 The treatment setting should provide for the freedom to
participate in society, and should permit disagreement with clinician
recommendations for care. A one size fits all approach should never
be the treatment option of choice, as an individual inquiry should be
the preferred method.
B.

Funding Challenges

In an ideal world, funding particular programs for persons with
disabilities would not be a factor in determining the appropriate
setting. A person with a mental illness would receive community
mental health services and suitable housing regardless of the cost.
One, of course, quickly recognizes that funding particular programs is
a complicated maze of public and private endeavors. Federal, state,
and local funding for social service programs is often intertwined, and
generally such public entities are focused on all residents of the
community, including the disabled and the non-disabled, the indigent,
the homeless, and other underserved populations in the community.202
When funding for such programs is in short supply, as it often is, local
and state agencies are forced to make tough choices regarding cuts and
allocation of limited resources.203
198 ELEANOR SULLIVAN & MICHAEL FLEMING, A GUIDE TO SUBSTANCE ABUSE SERVICES FOR
PRIMARY CARE CLINICIANS 78 (1997), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK64827/pdf/B
ookshelf_NBK64827.pdf.
199
Id. at 60.
200 Id. at 78.
201 Id. at 51.
202 See Concerned Parents to Save Dreher Park Ctr. v. City of W. Palm Beach, 846 F. Supp.
986, 993 (S.D. Fla. 1994).
203 See infra notes 204-09 and accompanying text.
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For instance, in West Palm Beach, Florida in 1986, the city
made “a variety of recreational and social programs available to
individuals with disabilities and their families.”204 In 1993, as a result
of budget cuts, the City made a choice to effectively eliminate these
programs.205 In the resulting litigation, the court held that the budget
cuts resulted in the complete elimination of the programs designed for
persons with disabilities.206 Rather than reduce the cost of all
recreational programming across the board, the City opted to eliminate
solely those programs for the disabled.207 The court in Dreher Park
noted that “[a]lthough the ADA contemplates that public entities will
provide ‘integrated settings’ for services and programs, the
requirement is for ‘the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs
of the individuals with disabilities.’”208 Although the recreation
programs that continued to receive funding were open to non-disabled
and the disabled, the specific nature of the recreation program
previously offered was specially designed to meet the unique needs of
persons with disabilities.209
The ADA permits different or separate programs to be
“provided if they are ‘necessary to provide qualified individuals with
disabilities with aids, benefits, or services that are as effective as those
provided to others.’”210 The court held that the Dreher Park Center
programs for disabled persons were “needed to give equal benefits of
recreation to persons with disabilities,” and when such programs were
eliminated, disabled persons were denied the benefit of the City’s
leisure services in violation of Title II of the ADA.211 The resounding
message from the court was that when the City chose to provide leisure
services to non-disabled persons, “the ADA requires that the City
provide equal opportunit[ies] for persons with disabilities to receive
comparable benefits.”212 Thus, the ADA clearly prohibits the

204

Dreher Park, 846 F. Supp. at 988.
Id. at 989.
206 Id. Recreational programs cut included summer day camps for disabled children,
adventure clubs for children with varying disabilities, social programs for visually-impaired
and blind adults and teenagers, programs for siblings of those with disabilities, a lip reading
instruction program, and more. Id. at 988.
207
Id. at 989.
208 Id. at 991 (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d)).
209 Id.
210 Id. (citing 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(1)(iv)).
211 Id. at 992.
212 Id.
205
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exclusion of persons with disabilities from meaningful participation in
programs and services when local and state governments are facing
budget deficits.213
The ADA strongly mandates inclusion rather than exclusion,
but separate programs may prove to be necessary to meet the mission
of providing persons with disabilities certain recreational programs.214
However, without funding to provide for these separate programs, the
promise of inclusion rings hollow.
This “necessity exception” has sometimes been used to justify
discrimination.
Fortunately, courts have largely rejected this
argument.215 In Burns-Vidlak ex rel. Burns v. Chandler, a challenge
was brought on behalf of blind and disabled individuals who claimed
they were being excluded from participation in Hawaii’s pilot program
for integrating preexisting health care plans.216 The court focused on
the ADA’s narrow exception that so-called discrimination is permitted
only when “necessary.”217 A public entity is prohibited from imposing
“eligibility criteria that screen out . . . [individuals with disabilities],
unless such criteria can be shown to be necessary for the provision of
the service, program or activity offered.”218 The court rejected as a
matter of law the State’s claim that the proposed healthcare program
does not violate the ADA “because it is ‘necessary’ to exclude disabled
individuals to ensure the financial viability of the program.”219 This
categorical exclusion from participation was appropriately rejected by
the court.
In Lovell v. Chandler, a later challenge to the same Hawaii
healthcare program, disabled persons again argued that they were
wrongfully excluded from participating in the program.220 The court
focused its discussion on providing different or separate benefits “if
‘such action is necessary to provide qualified individuals with
disabilities with aids, benefits, or services that are as effective as those
provided to others.’”221 The court held that the “‘different and
213

See supra notes 204-212 and accompanying text.
28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(1)(iv) (2018).
215 See infra notes 216-24 and accompanying text.
216 939 F. Supp. 765, 767-68 (D. Haw. 1996).
217
Id. at 769-70 (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(8)).
218 Id. (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(8)).
219 Id. at 772.
220 303 F.3d 1039, 1045-46 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that the ADA prohibits overt denials of
equal treatment of individuals with disabilities).
221 Id. at 1055 (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(1)(iv)).
214

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol35/iss1/20

34

Stone: Least Restrictive Environment

2019

LEAST RESTRICTIVE ENVIRONMENT

557

separate’ benefit the State provided was no benefit at all.”222 Thus,
“the State cannot avoid liability under the ‘necessity’ exception.”223
The ADA mandates that entities providing benefits for persons with
disabilities in an inclusive setting, or, when necessary, in a separate
setting, must be as effective as those services provided to others.224
Different or separate clearly does not mean the absence of benefits, but
rather services that are as effective as those provided to all citizens.
VII.

RECOMMENDATIONS

In order to respect the important liberty interests at stake for
persons with disabilities, it is imperative that the least restrictive
alternative is a central and guiding principle in a variety of settings
including community based mental health treatment, housing options,
appropriate educational settings and in all places of public
accommodations and government entities. For individuals with mental
or physical disabilities who seek the “right to fully participate in all
aspects of society,”225 from “employment, housing, public
accommodations,
education,
transportation,
communication,
recreation, institutionalization, health services, voting, and access to
services,” the ADA compels equality of opportunity, full participation,
independent living, and economic self-sufficiency.226 The following
are recommendations to guide state legislatures and private entities,
school officials, policymakers, and everyday individuals in
developing, implementing, and participating fully in an enlightened,
humane, and fair society, including those with mental or physical
disabilities in our nation:
1. In special education placement decisions, begin the
conversation on the appropriate setting with placement primarily in the
regular classroom setting for the majority of the day, and placement in
a specialized education classroom setting for part of the day.
Movement to a more or less restrictive setting along the cascade of
alternatives will depend on the decisions made at the IEP conference.

222

Id.
Id. See Messier v. Southbury Training Sch., 562 F. Supp. 2d 294 (D. Conn. 2008)
(pertaining to residents of a state-run institution for the mentally disabled who claimed a
violation of the ADA for the failure to place them in community based residential settings).
224 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(1)(iv) (2018).
225 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1) (2018).
226 Id. § 12101(a)(3).
223

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2019

35

Touro Law Review, Vol. 35, No. 1 [2019], Art. 20

558

TOURO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 35

2. When making an educational placement decision for a
student who is deaf or hard of hearing, the primary factor shall be
providing significant opportunities for receiving an education with
other students with similar disabilities, and such placement shall take
priority over education in the regular classroom with non-disabled
students.
3. In the civil commitment context, amend the state law criteria
for in-patient hospitalization to require a showing that there is no less
restrictive form of intervention that is appropriate and consistent with
the welfare and safety of the individual, removing from most state
statutes the additional “availability” clause.227
4. Explicitly place the burden in the civil commitment
proceedings on the moving party seeking involuntary hospitalization
to show that there is no appropriate less restrictive form of intervention
that is consistent with the welfare and safety of the individual.228
5. Coordinate mental health funding at the federal, state, and
local levels with a goal of offering community based outpatient mental
health treatment services to all those in need. Increase total funding
for such services by 50% over the next decade.
6. Require a coordinated effort between psychiatric hospitals
and community mental health service providers to create and fund
community based mental health treatment services to identify those
services currently available in the community.
7. Raise the burden of proof to beyond a reasonable doubt in
involuntary civil commitment hearings, or, at a minimum, on the
criterion that there is no less restrictive form of intervention that is
consistent with the welfare and safety of the individual, rather than the
clear and convincing standard currently in place in a vast majority of
state civil commitment statutes.
8. Continue to include the least restrictive alternative doctrine
in guardianship laws, termination of parental rights laws, and assisted
outpatient treatment statutes.
9. Support the principle that, as a society, we should provide
greater protections to the mentally ill, ensuring that involuntary

227

See supra Section IV.B; see also infra Appendix A.
See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-925(1) (“The state has the burden to prove by clear and
convincing evidence that . . . neither voluntary hospitalization nor other treatment alternatives
less restrictive of the subject’s liberty than inpatient or outpatient treatment ordered by the
mental health board are available or would suffice to prevent the harm.”).
228

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol35/iss1/20

36

Stone: Least Restrictive Environment

2019

LEAST RESTRICTIVE ENVIRONMENT

559

inpatient confinement is truly a last resort when all less restrictive
forms of intervention are inappropriate.
10. Mandate each state mental health agency to create and fund
additional community based treatment and housing alternatives for all
persons facing involuntary civil commitment. Requiring the state to
provide a written discharge plan including outpatient mental health
care and housing to the administrative law judge hearing the civil
commitment of a person facing involuntary admission into a
psychiatric facility within 10 days of said person being initially
admitted to a facility on an observational status.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The least restrictive environment, the guiding principle for
education and treatment and acceptance of persons with disabilities, is
here to stay. Revisiting and reevaluating the concept will lead to even
greater acceptance of persons with disabilities into the mainstream of
society. Forcing government officials to expand funding, think and act
creatively, and consider a variety of alternatives in the mental health
and special education arenas will benefit all of society.
There is clearly a recognition of the importance of inclusion
and mainstreaming of disabled individuals into all aspects of society.
Isolation and exclusion have hopefully given way to a more
enlightened society, and with more acceptance of individuals who are
viewed as different. The provision of services ranging from education,
treatment, housing, and participating in programs and activities offered
in the least restrictive environment continues to guide the disability
advocacy movement.
One must continue to examine the significance that the LRE
has on the design of an appropriate education, treatment, housing, and
services or programs offered to individuals with disabilities. We as a
society must not default to the LRE simply out of convenience when it
is often the least expensive alternative to fund. The prominent cascade
of alternatives in education, treatment, housing, and services must be
the approach. We must continue to respect individual choice and
independent decision-making authority. One size fits all should never
be the approach in serving disabled children, adults with mental illness,
or deaf or physically disabled individuals.
Whether the concept is called “the less restrictive form of
intervention,” “less drastic means,” “least restrictive environment,”
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“least restrictive alternative,” “least restrictive appropriate setting,”
“least restrictive treatment alternative,” or “least restrictive alternative
mode of treatment,” what is clear is the desire of all of us to be
unwavering in our desire to experience equality of opportunity, full
participation, independent living, and to be left free of government
intrusion and constraint. Let us all make the LRE more than an empty
mandate by removing frustrations and opening up the dialogue to the
endless possibilities a society that steeps in the LRE concept can bring
about.
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APPENDIX A
THE LRE IN CIVIL COMMITMENT STATUTES: A STATE BY
STATE GUIDE
State

Statute

Statutory Language

Statutory
Definition
Provided?

Alabama

ALA. CODE §
22-52-10.1
(2019)

The least restrictive
alternative necessary
and available for the
treatment of the
respondent’s mental
illness shall be ordered.

None

Alaska

ALASKA STAT.
§ 47.30.755(b)
(2019)

If the court finds that
there is a less restrictive
alternative available and
that the respondent has
been advised of and
refused voluntary
treatment through the
alternative, the court may
order the less restrictive
alternative treatment
after acceptance by the
program of the respondent
for a period not to exceed
90 days.

ALASKA STAT. §
47.30.915(11) (2019):
“[L]east restrictive
alternative” means
mental health
treatment facilities and
conditions of treatment
that
(A) are no more
harsh, hazardous, or
intrusive than
necessary to achieve
the treatment
objectives of the
patient; and
(B) involve no
restrictions on physical
movement nor
supervised residence
or inpatient care
except as reasonably
necessary for the
administration of
treatment or the
protection of the
patient or others from
physical injury[.]
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Arizona

ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN.
§ 36-540(B)
(2019)

The court shall consider all
available and
appropriate alternatives
for the treatment and care
of the patient. The court
shall order the least
restrictive treatment
alternative available.

ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 36-501(21)
(2019):
“Least restrictive
treatment alternative”
means the treatment
plan and setting that
infringe in the least
possible degree with
the patient’s right to
liberty and that are
consistent with
providing needed
treatment in a safe
and humane manner.

Arkansas

ARK. CODE
ANN. § 2047-214(c)
(2019)

This section shall be
construed to allow the
person sought to be
involuntarily admitted to
request treatment under an
alternative least restrictive
appropriate setting.

ARK. CODE ANN. §
20-47-202(11)
(2019):
“Least restrictive
appropriate setting”
for treatment means
the available
treatment setting
which provides the
person with the
highest likelihood of
improvement or cure
and which is not
more restrictive of
the person’s physical
or social liberties
than is necessary for
the most effective
treatment of the
person and for
adequate protection
against any dangers
which the person
poses to himself or
herself or others[.]
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CAL. WELF.
& INST.
CODE §
6509(a)
(West
2019)

If the court finds that the person has a
developmental disability, and is a
danger to himself, herself, or to others,
the court may make an order that the
person be committed to the State
Department of Developmental Services
for suitable treatment and habilitation
services. Suitable treatment and
habilitation services is defined as the
least restrictive residential placement
necessary to achieve the purposes of
treatment.

None

Colorado

COLO. REV.
STAT. § 2765116(1)(a)
(2019)

Any person receiving evaluation or
treatment under any of the provisions
of this article is entitled to medical and
psychiatric care and treatment, with
regard to services listed in section 2766-101 and services listed in rules
authorized by section 27-66-102, suited
to meet his or her individual needs,
delivered in such a way as to keep
him or her in the least restrictive
environment, and delivered in such a
way as to include the opportunity for
participation of family members in his
or her program of care and treatment
when appropriate, all subject to
available appropriations

None

Connecticut

CONN.
GEN. STAT.
§ 17a498(c)(3)
(2019)

If the court finds by clear and
convincing evidence that the
respondent has psychiatric disabilities
and is dangerous to himself or herself
or others or gravely disabled, the court
shall make an order for his or her
commitment, considering whether or
not a less restrictive placement is
available, to a hospital for psychiatric
disabilities to be named in such order,
there to be confined for the period of
the duration of such psychiatric
disabilities or until he or she is
discharged or converted to voluntary
status pursuant to section 17a-506 in
due course of law.

None
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Delaware

DEL. CODE
ANN. tit.16,
§ 5005(a)
(2019)

At the completion of the emergency
detention period, the person shall not
be admitted to a hospital except
pursuant to the written certification of a
psychiatrist that based upon the
psychiatrist’s examination of such
person:
(1) Appears to be a person with a
mental condition;
(2) The person has been offered
voluntary inpatient treatment and has
declined such care and treatment or
lacks the capacity to knowingly and
voluntarily consent to such care and
treatment;
(3) As a result of the person’s apparent
mental condition, the person poses a
present threat, based upon manifest
indications, of being dangerous to self
or dangerous to others; and
(4) Less restrictive alternatives have
been considered and determined to
be clinically inappropriate at the
present time.

None

District of
Columbia

D.C. CODE
§ 21545(b)(2)
(2019)

If the Court or jury finds that the
person is mentally ill and, because of
that mental illness, is likely to injure
himself or others if not committed, the
Court may order the person’s
commitment to the Department or to
any other facility, hospital, or mental
health provider that the Court believes
is the least restrictive alternative
consistent with the best interests of
the person and the public. An order
of commitment issued pursuant to this
paragraph shall be for a period of one
year.

None
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Florida

FLA. STAT. §
394.467(1)(b)
(2019)

A person may be
ordered for
involuntary inpatient
placement for
treatment upon a
finding of the court
by clear and
convincing evidence
that . . . [a]ll
available less
restrictive treatment
alternatives that
would offer an
opportunity for
improvement of his
or her condition have
been judged to be
inappropriate.

None

Georgia

GA. CODE
ANN. § 37-4121 (2019)

It is the policy of the
state that the least
restrictive
alternative
placement be secured
for every client at
every stage of his
habilitation. It shall
be the duty of the
facility to assist the
client in securing
placement in noninstitutional
community facilities
and programs.

GA. CODE ANN. § 37-3-1
(2019):
“Least restrictive
alternative,” “least
restrictive environment,”
or “least restrictive
appropriate care and
treatment” means that
which is the least
restrictive available
alternative, environment,
or care and treatment,
respectively, within the
limits of state funds
specifically appropriated
therefor.
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Hawaii

HAW.
REV.
STAT. §
334-60.2
(2019)

A person may be committed to a psychiatric
facility for involuntary hospitalization, if the
court finds:
(1) That the person is mentally ill or suffering
from substance abuse;
(2) That the person is imminently dangerous to
self or others; and
(3) That the person is in need of care or
treatment, or both, and there is no suitable
alternative available through existing
facilities and programs which would be less
restrictive than hospitalization.

None

Idaho

IDAHO
CODE §
66329(11)
(2019)

[T]he court shall order the proposed patient
committed to the custody of the department
director for observation, care and treatment for
an indeterminate period of time not to exceed
one (1) year. The department director, through
his dispositioner, shall determine within twentyfour (24) hours the least restrictive available
facility or outpatient treatment, consistent
with the needs of each patient committed under
this section for observation, care, and treatment.

None

Illinois

405 ILL.
COMP.
STAT. 5/3811(a)
(2019)

If any person is found subject to involuntary
admission on an inpatient basis, the court shall
consider alternative mental health facilities
which are appropriate for and available to the
respondent, including but not limited to
hospitalization. The court may order the
respondent to undergo a program of
hospitalization in a mental health facility
designated by the Department, in a licensed
private hospital or private mental health facility
if it agrees, or in a facility of the United States
Veterans Administration if it agrees. If any
person is found subject to involuntary admission
on an outpatient basis, the court may order the
respondent to undergo a program of alternative
treatment; or the court may place the respondent
in the care and custody of a relative or other
person willing and able to properly care for him
or her. The court shall order the least restrictive
alternative for treatment which is
appropriate.

None
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Indiana

See
generally
IND. CODE
§ 12-26
(2019)

Consideration of LRE not explicitly required by
civil commitment statute (IND. CODE § 12-26-6)
Note: LRE standard for commitment adopted by
case law as “least restrictive environment
suitable for [] treatment.” In re Commitment of
T.K. v. Dep’t of Veteran Affairs, 993 N.E.2d
245, 251 (Ind. 2013). LRE standard is present
only in statute regarding suitability of facility:
“The court may order temporary placement of
the individual in the least restrictive suitable
facility pending admission to a facility.” IND.
CODE § 12-26-10-2 (2019).

None

Iowa

See IOWA
CODE R.
13.24

Consideration of LRE not explicitly required by
civil commitment statute (IOWA CODE § 299).
The most relevant mention in Evaluation report
court rules (IOWA CODE R. 13.24) is: “The
evaluation also shall specify the basis for the
attending physician’s conclusions concerning
recommended treatment and the basis for the
judgment that the recommended treatment is the
least restrictive alternative possible for the
respondent pursuant to options (1), (2), (3), or
(4) of Iowa Code section 125.84.”

None

Kansas

KAN.
STAT.
ANN. §
592961(b)
(2019)

Such report shall state that the examiner has
made an examination of the proposed patient
and shall state the opinion of the examiner on
the issue of whether or not the proposed patient
is a mentally ill person subject to involuntary
commitment for care and treatment under the act
and the examiner’s opinion as to the least
restrictive treatment alternative which will
protect the proposed patient and others and
allow for the improvement of the proposed
patient if treatment is ordered.

None
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KY. REV.
STAT.
ANN. §
202B.040
(West
2019)

When a person who is alleged
to be an individual with an
intellectual disability is
involuntarily admitted, there
shall be a determination that:
(1) The person is an individual
with an intellectual disability;
(2) The person presents a
danger or a threat of danger to
self, family, or others;
(3) The least restrictive
alternative mode of
treatment presently available
requires placement in an
ICF/ID; and
(4) Treatment that can
reasonably benefit the person is
available in an ICF/ID.
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Vol. 35
KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 202B.010 (West
2019):
“Least restrictive
alternative mode of
treatment” means that
treatment given in the
least confining setting
which will provide an
individual with an
intellectual disability
appropriate treatment
or care consistent with
accepted professional
practice. For purposes
of this section, least
restrictive alternative
mode of treatment
may include an
institutional
placement[.]
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Louisiana

LA. STAT.
ANN. §
28:55(e)(1)
(2019)

If the court finds by clear and convincing
evidence that the respondent is dangerous to
self or others or is gravely disabled, as a
result of a substance-related or addictive
disorder or mental illness, it shall render a
judgment for his commitment. After
considering all relevant circumstances,
including clinical recommendations and any
preference of the respondent or his family,
the court shall determine whether the
respondent should be committed to a
treatment facility which is medically
suitable and least restrictive of the
respondent’s liberty. However, if the
placement determined by the court is
unavailable, the court may commit the
respondent to the Louisiana Department of
Health for appropriate placement subject
to availability of department resources
until such time as an opening is available
for transfer to the treatment facility
determined by the court. If the department
is not the petitioner, the parties shall first
consult with the department or its counsel
before entering into a judgment stipulating
to a commitment of the respondent to the
department.

None

Maine

ME. STAT.
tit. 34-B, §
3864(5)(E)
(2019)

In addition to proving that the patient is a
mentally ill individual, the applicant must
show:
(1) By evidence of the patient’s recent
actions and behavior, that due to the
patient’s mental illness the patient poses a
likelihood of serious harm; and
(2) That, after full consideration of less
restrictive treatment settings and
modalities, inpatient hospitalization is the
best available means for the treatment of
the person.

None
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MD. CODE
ANN.,
HEALTHGEN. § 10632(e)
(2019)

The hearing officer shall . . . order the
release of the individual from the facility
unless the record demonstrates by clear and
convincing evidence that at the time of the
hearing each of the following elements exist
as to the individual whose involuntary
admission is sought:
(i) The individual has a mental disorder;
(ii) The individual needs in-patient care or
treatment;
(iii) The individual presents a danger to the
life or safety of the individual or of others;
(iv) The individual is unable or unwilling to
be voluntarily admitted to the facility;
(v) There is no available less restrictive
form of intervention that is consistent
with the welfare and safety of the
individual[.]
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LEAST RESTRICTIVE ENVIRONMENT
See MASS.
ABUSE
PREVENTION
PROCEEDING
GUIDELINE
10:06
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Consideration of LRE not directly
required by civil commitment statute
(MASS GEN. LAWS ch. 123, § 12
(2019))
The most relevant mention in
Commentary on proceeding guidelines
(MASS. ABUSE PREVENTION
PROCEEDING GUIDELINE 10:06) is:
“On occasion, the behavior of a party
involved in a c. 209A action is such
that involuntary civil commitment may
be appropriate. The standard for such
commitment is: (1) the party suffers
from a ‘mental illness,’ which for the
purposes of involuntary commitment is
defined as ‘a substantial disorder of
thought, mood, perception, orientation,
or memory which grossly impairs
judgment, behavior, capacity to
recognize reality or ability to meet the
ordinary demands of life, but shall not
include alcoholism or substance abuse
which is defined in G.L. c. 123, § 35,’
104 Code Mass. Regs. § 27.05(1)
(promulgated by the Department of
Mental Health); (2) poses a danger of
serious harm, either to the person
himself or to others; and (3) there is no
less restrictive alternative to
commitment available.”
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Michigan

MICH.
COMP.
LAWS §
330.1708(3)
(2019)

Mental health services shall be offered in
the least restrictive setting that is
appropriate and available.

None

Minnesota

MINN.
STAT. §
253B.18(a)
(2019

The court shall commit the patient to a
secure treatment facility unless the patient
establishes by clear and convincing
evidence that a less restrictive treatment
program is available that is consistent
with the patient’s treatment needs and the
requirements of public safety.

None

Mississippi

MISS. CODE
ANN. § 4121-73(6)
(2019)

The court shall state the findings of fact
and conclusions of law that constitute the
basis for the order of commitment. The
findings shall include a listing of less
restrictive alternatives considered by the
court and the reasons that each was found
not suitable.

None

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol35/iss1/20

50

Stone: Least Restrictive Environment

2019

LEAST RESTRICTIVE ENVIRONMENT
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MO. REV.
STAT. §
632.350(5)
(2019)

At the conclusion of the
hearing, if the court or
jury finds that the
respondent, as the result of
mental illness, presents a
likelihood of serious harm
to himself or to others, and
the court finds that a
program appropriate to
handle the respondent’s
condition has agreed to
accept him, the court shall
order the respondent to be
detained for involuntary
treatment in the least
restrictive environment
for a period not to exceed
ninety days or for
outpatient detention and
treatment under the
supervision of a mental
health program in the least
restrictive environment
for a period not to exceed
one hundred eighty days.

Montana

MONT.
CODE ANN.
§ 53-21120(1)
(2019)

A person detained
pursuant to this part must
be detained in the least
restrictive environment
required to protect the
life and physical safety of
the person detained or
members of the public; in
this respect, prevention of
significant injury to
property may be
considered.
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MO. REV. STAT. §
630.005 (2019):
“Least restrictive
environment”, a
reasonably available
setting or mental health
program where care,
treatment, habilitation
or rehabilitation is
particularly suited to
the level and quality of
services necessary to
implement a person’s
individualized
treatment, habilitation
or rehabilitation plan
and to enable the
person to maximize his
or her functioning
potential to participate
as freely as feasible in
normal living
activities, giving due
consideration to
potentially harmful
effects on the person
and the safety of other
facility or program
clients and public
safety
None
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NEB. REV.
The state has the burden to
None
STAT. § 71prove by clear and
925(1) (2019) convincing evidence that (a)
the subject is mentally ill and
dangerous and (b) neither
voluntary hospitalization nor
other treatment alternatives
less restrictive of the
subject’s liberty than
inpatient or outpatient
treatment ordered by the
mental health board are
available or would suffice to
prevent the harm.
NEV. REV.
Before issuing an order for
None
STAT. §
involuntary admission or a
433A.310(6) renewal thereof, the court
(2019)
shall explore other alternative
courses of treatment within
the least restrictive
appropriate environment,
including involuntary
admission to a program of
community-based or
outpatient services, as
suggested by the evaluation
team who evaluated the
person, or other persons
professionally qualified in the
field of psychiatric mental
health, which the court
believes may be in the best
interests of the person.
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LEAST RESTRICTIVE ENVIRONMENT
None

Consideration of LRE not directly
required by involuntary civil
commitment statute (N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 135-C:27 (2019))
The most relevant mention is in
“Purpose and Policy” provision
(N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135-C:1):

575
None

“It is the policy of this state
to provide to persons who are
severely mentally disabled
adequate and humane care
which, to the extent possible
while meeting the purposes
of habilitation and treatment,
is. . . [l]east restrictive of the
person’s freedom of
movement and ability to
function normally in society
while being appropriate to the
person’s individual capacity.”
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New
Jersey

N.J. STAT.
ANN. §
30:427.15a(a)
(West 2019)

In determining the commitment
placement, the court shall
consider the least restrictive
environment for the patient to
receive clinically appropriate
treatment that would ameliorate
the danger posed by the patient
and provide the patient with
appropriate treatment.

N.J. STAT. ANN. §
30:4-27.2(gg)
(2019):
“Least restrictive
environment”
means the
available setting
and form of
treatment that
appropriately
addresses a
person’s need for
care and the need
to respond to
dangers to the
person, others or
property and
respects, to the
greatest extent
practicable, the
person’s interests
in freedom of
movement and
self-direction.

New
Mexico

None

Consideration of LRE not
directly required by involuntary
civil commitment statute (N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 43-1-11 (2019)).
The most relevant mention is in
“Individualized Treatment and
Habilitation Plans” provision
(N.M. STAT. ANN. § 43-1-9):
“Each individualized treatment
or habilitation plan shall include
. . . a statement of the least
restrictive conditions necessary
to achieve the purposes of
treatment or habilitation . . .
[and] criteria for release to less
restrictive settings for treatment
or habilitation.”

None
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New York

None

Consideration of LRE not directly required by
involuntary civil commitment statute for
inpatient treatment (N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW §
9.33 (McKinney 2019)).
The most relevant mention is in “Assisted
Outpatient Treatment” provision (N.Y. MENTAL
HYG. LAW § 9.60(h)(4)):
“A physician who testifies pursuant to paragraph
two of this subdivision shall state: (i) the facts
which support the allegation that the subject
meets each of the criteria for assisted outpatient
treatment, (ii) that the treatment is the least
restrictive alternative . . . .”

None

North
Carolina

None

Consideration of LRE not directly required by
involuntary civil commitment statute (N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 122C-261 through 280 (2019)).
The most relevant mention is in “Declaration of
Policy” provision regarding voluntary
commitment (N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-201):
“It is further State policy that, except as
provided in G.S. 122C-212(b), individuals who
have been voluntarily admitted shall be
discharged upon application and that
involuntarily committed individuals shall be
discharged as soon as a less restrictive mode of
treatment is appropriate.”

None
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North
Dakota

N.D. CENT.
CODE § 2501.2-012 (2019)

All individuals with
developmental disabilities
have a right to appropriate
treatment, services, and
habilitation for those
disabilities. Treatment,
services, and habilitation
for individuals with a
developmental disability
must be provided in the
least restrictive
appropriate setting.

N.D. CENT. CODE §
25-01.2-01 (2019):
“Least restrictive
appropriate setting”
means that setting
that allows an
individual with a
developmental
disability to
develop and realize
the individual’s
fullest potential and
enhances the
individual’s ability
to cope with the
individual’s
environment
without
unnecessarily
curtailing
fundamental
personal liberties.

Ohio

OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. §
5122.15(E)
(West 2019)

[C]ourt shall consider the
diagnosis, prognosis,
preferences of the
respondent and the
projected treatment plan
for the respondent and
shall order the
implementation of the
least restrictive
alternative available and
consistent with
treatment goals. If the
court determines that the
least restrictive
alternative available
that is consistent with
treatment goals is
inpatient hospitalization,
the court’s order shall so
state.

None
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Oklahoma

OKLA. STAT. tit.
43A, § 5415(E) (2019)

After the hearing, when the court
determines the person to be a person
requiring treatment, the court shall
order the person to receive the least
restrictive treatment consistent
with the treatment needs of the
person and the safety of the
person and others.
(1)The court shall not order
hospitalization without a thorough
consideration of available treatment
alternatives to hospitalization and
may direct the submission of
evidence as to the least restrictive
treatment alternative or may order
a mental health examination.

None

Oregon

OR. REV. STAT.
§ 427.306(2)
(2019)

The person shall be detained in the
least restrictive setting consistent
with the person’s emotional and
physical needs and the protection
of others.

None
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50 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 7304(f)
(2019)
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Upon a finding by clear and
convincing evidence that the
person is severely mentally
disabled and in need of
treatment and subject to
subsection (a), an order shall
be entered directing treatment
of the person in an approved
facility as an inpatient or an
outpatient, or a combination
of such treatment as the
director of the facility shall
from time to time determine.
Inpatient treatment shall be
deemed appropriate only
after full consideration has
been given to less restrictive
alternatives. Investigation of
treatment alternatives shall
include consideration of the
person’s relationship to his
community and family, his
employment possibilities, all
available community
resources, and guardianship
services. An order for
inpatient treatment shall
include findings on this issue.

Vol. 35
55 PA. CODE
§ 5100.2
(2019):
Least
restrictive
alternate —
The least
restrictive
placement or
status
available and
appropriate to
meet the
needs of the
patient and
includes both
restrictions on
personal
liberty and
the proximity
of the
treatment
facility to the
person’s
natural
environment.
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Rhode Island

40.1 R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 40.1-58(j) (2019)
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If the court at a final hearing finds by
clear and convincing evidence that
the subject of the hearing is in need
of care and treatment in a facility,
and is one whose continued
unsupervised presence in the
community would, by reason of
mental disability, create a likelihood
of serious harm, and that all
alternatives to certification have
been investigated and deemed
unsuitable, it shall issue an order
committing the person to the custody
of the director for care and treatment
or to an appropriate facility. In either
event, and to the extent practicable,
the person shall be cared for in a
facility that imposes the least
restraint upon the liberty of the
person consistent with affording
him or her the care and treatment
necessary and appropriate to his or
her condition. No certification shall
be made under this section unless and
until full consideration has been
given by the certifying court to the
alternatives to in-patient care,
including, but not limited to, a
determination of the person’s
relationship to the community and to
his or her family, of his or her
employment possibilities, and of all
available community resources,
alternate available living
arrangements, foster care,
community residential facilities,
nursing homes, and other
convalescent facilities.

581
None

59

Touro Law Review, Vol. 35, No. 1 [2019], Art. 20

582

TOURO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 35

South
Carolina

None

Consideration of LRE
not directly required by
involuntary civil
commitment statute (S.C.
CODE ANN. § 44-17-410).

None

South
Dakota

S.D.
CODIFIED
LAWS §
27A-10-9.1
(2019)

Upon completion of the
hearing provided in § 27A10-8, the board of mental
illness may order the
involuntary commitment of
the person for an initial
period not to exceed ninety
days if a majority of the
board finds by clear and
convincing evidence,
supported by written
findings of fact and
conclusions of law, that:
(1) The person meets the
criteria in § 27A-1-2;
(2) The person needs and is
likely to benefit from the
treatment which is
proposed; and
(3) The commitment is to
the least restrictive
treatment alternative.

S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §
27A-1-1(15) (2019):
“Least restrictive
treatment alternative, the
treatment and conditions
of treatment which,
separately and in
combination, are no
more intrusive or
restrictive of mental,
social, or physical
freedom than necessary
to achieve a reasonably
adequate therapeutic
benefit. In determining
the least restrictive
alternative,
considerations shall
include the values and
preferences of the
patient, the
environmental
restrictiveness of
treatment settings, the
duration of treatment, the
physical safety of the
patient and others, the
psychological and
physical restrictiveness
of treatments, the
relative risks and
benefits of treatments to
the patient, the proximity
of the treatment program
to the patient’s
residence, and the
availability of family and
community resources
and support.
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Tennessee

TENN. CODE.
ANN. § 33-6-403
(2019)

Involuntary civil
commitment statute
does not use LRE
language, but
incorporates the
concept. TENN. CODE.
ANN. § 33-6-403:
“If and only if . . . all
available less drastic
alternatives to
placement in a hospital
or treatment resource
are unsuitable to meet
the needs of the person .
. . then [] the person
may be admitted and
detained by a hospital
or treatment resource
for emergency
diagnosis, evaluation.”

None

Texas

TEX. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE
ANN. §
571.036(d)
(2019)

The judge shall order
the mental health
services provided in the
least restrictive
appropriate setting
available.

TEX. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE ANN. §
571.004 (2019):
“The least restrictive
appropriate setting
for the treatment of a
patient is the
treatment setting that:
(1) is available;
(2) provides the
patient with the
greatest probability of
improvement or cure;
and
(3) is no more
restrictive of the
patient’s physical or
social liberties than is
necessary to provide
the patient with the
most effective
treatment and to
protect adequately
against any danger
the patient poses to
himself or others”
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Utah

UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 62A-15631(16)(d) (West
2019)

The court shall order commitment
of a proposed patient who is 18
years of age or older to a local
mental health authority if, upon
completion of the hearing and
consideration of the information
presented in accordance with
Subsection (15)(d), the court finds
by clear and convincing evidence
that . . . there is no appropriate
less-restrictive alternative to a
court order of commitment[.]

None

Vermont

VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
18, § 7617(c)
(2019)

Involuntary civil commitment
statute does not use LRE language,
but incorporates concept. VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 18, § 7617(c):
“Prior to ordering any course of
treatment, the court shall determine
whether there exists an available
program of treatment for the person
which is an appropriate alternative
to hospitalization. The court shall
not order hospitalization without a
thorough consideration of available
alternatives.”

None

Virginia

VA. CODE ANN. §
37.2-817(c) (2019)

If the judge or special justice finds
by clear and convincing evidence
that . . . all available less restrictive
treatment alternatives to
involuntary inpatient treatment,
pursuant to subsection D, that would
offer an opportunity for the
improvement of the person’s
condition have been investigated
and determined to be
inappropriate[.]

None
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Washington

WASH. REV. CODE §
71.05.230(4)(a)(i)(B)
(ii) (2018)

If involuntary
detention is sought
the petition shall state
facts that support the
finding that such
person, as a result of
a mental disorder or
substance use
disorder, presents a
likelihood of serious
harm, or is gravely
disabled and that
there are no less
restrictive
alternatives to
detention in the best
interest of such
person or others. The
petition shall state
specifically that less
restrictive
alternative
treatment was
considered and
specify why
treatment less
restrictive than
detention is not
appropriate.

WASH. REV.
CODE §
71.05.020
(2019):
“Less restrictive
alternative
treatment” means
a program of
individualized
treatment in a
less restrictive
setting than
inpatient
treatment that
includes the
services
described in
RCW 71.05.585.

West
Virginia

W. VA. CODE § 27-54(k)(1)(D) (2019)

Whether there is a
less restrictive
alternative than
commitment
appropriate for the
individual. The
burden of proof of
the lack of a less
restrictive
alternative than
commitment is on the
person or persons
seeking the
commitment of the
individual.

None
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Wisconsin

WIS. STAT. §
51.61(1)(e)
(2019)

[E]ach patient shall . . .
[e]xcept in the case of a
patient who is admitted
or transferred under s.
51.35(3) or 51.37 or
under ch. 971 or 975,
have the right to the
least restrictive
conditions necessary to
achieve the purposes of
admission, commitment
or protective placement.

WIS. ADMIN.
CODE DHS §
94.02(27):
“Least restrictive
treatment” means
treatment and
services which
will best meet the
patient’s treatment
and security needs
and which least
limit the patient’s
freedom of choice
and mobility.

Wyoming

WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 25-10110(j) (2019)

If, upon completion of
the hearing and
consideration of the
record, the court or the
jury finds by clear and
convincing evidence that
the proposed patient is
mentally ill the court
shall consider the least
restrictive and most
therapeutic
alternatives.

None
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APPENDIX B:
AT-A-GLANCE LRE STATUTORY LANGUAGE
AL

AK

AZ

AR

CA

CO

CT

DE

D.C.

FL

GA

ALA. CODE §
22-52-10.1
(2019)
ALASKA STAT.
§ 47.30.755(b)
(2019)
ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. §
36-540(b)
(2019)
ARK. CODE
ANN. § 20-47214(c) (2019)
CAL. WELF. &
INST. CODE §
6509(a) (West
2019)
COLO. REV.
STAT. § 27-65116(1)(a)
(2019)
CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 17a498(c)(3)
(2019)
DEL. CODE
ANN. tit.16, §
5005(a) (2019)
D.C. CODE §
21-545(b)(2)
(2019)
FLA. STAT. §
394.467(1)(b)
(2019)
GA. CODE ANN.
§ 37-4-121
(2019)
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Least restrictive alternative necessary and available

Less restrictive alternative available

Least restrictive appropriate setting

Least restrictive treatment alternative available /
Available and appropriate
Least restrictive residential placement necessary

Least restrictive environment

Less restrictive placement is available

Less restrictive alternatives have been considered
and determined to be clinically inappropriate
Least restrictive alternative consistent with the best
interests of the person and the public
Available less restrictive treatment alternatives

Least restrictive alternative
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HI

ID

IL

IN
IA
KS

KY

LA

ME

MD

MA

MI

MN

MS

TOURO LAW REVIEW
HAW. REV.
STAT. § 33460.2 (2019)
IDAHO CODE §
66-329(11)
(2019)
405 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/3811(a) (2019)
None
See IOWA CODE
R. 13.24
KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 592961(b) (2019)
KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. §
202B.040 (West
2019)
LA. STAT. ANN.
§ 28:55(e)(1)
(2019)
ME. STAT. tit.
34-B, §
3864(5)(E)
(2019)
MD. CODE
ANN., HEALTHGEN. § 10632(e) (2019)
See MASS.
ABUSE
PREVENTION
PROCEEDING
GUIDELINE
10:06
MICH. COMP.
LAWS §
330.1708(3)
(2019)
MINN. STAT. §
253B.18(a)
(2019)
MISS. CODE
ANN. § 41-2173(6) (2019)

Vol. 35

No suitable alternative available through existing
facilities and programs which would be less restrictive
than hospitalization
Least restrictive available facility or outpatient
treatment
Least restrictive alternative for treatment which is
appropriate / Appropriate for and available to the
respondent
None
Least restrictive alternative possible
Least restrictive treatment alternative

Least restrictive alternative mode of treatment presently
available

Medically suitable and least restrictive of the
respondent’s liberty / Appropriate placement subject to
availability of department resources
Less restrictive treatment settings and modalities / Best
available means for treatment

No available less restrictive form of intervention

No less restrictive alternative to commitment available

Least restrictive setting that is appropriate and available

Less restrictive treatment program is available

Less restrictive alternatives
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MO

MT

NE

NV

NH

NJ

NM
NY

NC

ND

OH

OK

OR

PA

LEAST RESTRICTIVE ENVIRONMENT
MO. REV. STAT.
§ 632.350(5)
(2019)
MONT. CODE
ANN. § 53-21120(1) (2019)
NEB. REV.
STAT. § 71925(1) (2019)
NEV. REV.
STAT. §
433A.310(6)
(2019)
None

N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 30:427.15a(a) (West
2019)
None
See N.Y.
MENTAL HYG.
LAW § 9.60
(McKinney
2019)
See N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 122C201 (2019)
N.D. CENT.
CODE § 2501.2-012 (2019)
OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. §
5122.15(E)
(West 2019)
OKLA. STAT. tit.
43A, § 5415(E) (2019)
OR. REV. STAT.
§ 427.306(2)
(2019)
50 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 7304(f)
(2019)

589

Least restrictive environment

Least restrictive environment required to protect the
life and physical safety
Treatment alternatives less restrictive of the subject’s
liberty than inpatient or outpatient treatment ordered by
the mental health board are available or would suffice
Least restrictive appropriate environment

Least restrictive of the person’s freedom of movement
and ability to function normally in society while being
appropriate to the person’s individual capacity
Least restrictive conditions necessary / Less restrictive
settings

Less restrictive settings for treatment
Least restrictive alternative

Less restrictive mode of treatment is appropriate

Least restrictive appropriate setting

Least restrictive alternative available and consistent with
treatment goals

Least restrictive treatment consistent with the treatment
needs of the person and the safety of the person and
others / Least restrictive treatment alternatives
Least restrictive setting consistent with the person’s
emotional and physical needs and the protection of
others
Less restrictive alternatives
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RI

40.1 R.I. GEN. LAWS §
40.1-5-8(j) (2019)

SC
SD

None
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §
27A-10-9.1 (2019)
TENN. CODE. ANN. §
33-6-403 (2019)
TEX. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE ANN. §
571.036(d) (2019)
UTAH CODE ANN. §
62A-15-631(16)(d)
(West 2019)
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18,
§ 7617(c) (2019)

TN
TX

UT

VT

VA
WA

WV
WI
WY

VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2817(c) (2019)
WASH. REV. CODE §
71.05.230(4)(a)(i)(B)(ii)
(2018)
W. VA. CODE § 27-54(k)(1)(D) (2019
WIS. STAT. §
51.61(1)(e) (2019)
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 2510-110(j) (2019)

Vol. 35

All alternatives to certification have been
investigated and deemed unsuitable / The least
restraint upon the liberty of the person consistent
with affording him or her the care and treatment
necessary and appropriate
None
Least restrictive treatment alternative
Available less drastic alternatives
Least restrictive appropriate setting available

Appropriate less-restrictive alternative

Available program of treatment for the person
which is an appropriate alternative to
hospitalization
Available less restrictive treatment alternatives
Less restrictive alternative treatment

Less restrictive alternative
Least restrictive conditions necessary
Least restrictive
alternatives

and

most

therapeutic

Note: Not all the LRE language listed on the shorthand chart are direct requirements
for involuntary commitment. Relevant mentions included in the commitment statute
are included here as well (e.g., LRE language related to the choice of facility)
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